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CHANGING THE PARADIGM OF STOCK OWNERSHIP FROM CONCENTRATED TOWARDS
DISPERSED OWNERSHIP?
EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL AND CONSEQUENCES FOR EMERGING COUNTRIES
Érica Gorga
Abstract
This paper analyzes micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership structures. It
investigates a unique event: changes in ownership patterns currently taking place in Brazil. It
builds upon empirical evidence to advance theoretical understanding of how and why
concentrated ownership structures can change towards dispersed ownership.
Commentators argue that the Brazilian capital markets are finally taking off. The
number of listed companies and IPOs in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has greatly
increased. Firms are migrating to Bovespa’s special listing segments, which require higher
standards of corporate governance. Companies have sold control in the market, and the stock
market has recently seen an attempted hostile takeover. This paper discusses these current
developments and analyzes ownership structures of companies listed on Bovespa’s listing
segments based on data from 2006 and 2007. It provides the first evidence of the decline of
ownership concentration in Brazilian corporations.
There is, however, an important caveat: dispersed ownership is mainly found in Novo
Mercado, the listing segment that requires the one-share-one-vote rule. This paper, then,
investigates firms’ migration patterns, and finds that 85% of Novo Mercado’s are “new
entrant” firms. Traditional firms have mostly migrated to Level 1, the least stringent corporate
governance segment. Thus, there are two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets: new
corporations that adopt proactive corporate governance patterns, and established corporations
that retain their main patterns of corporate governance or ownership structure.
This paper additionally explores the consequences of increased dispersion of ownership
through private contracting, such as shareholders’ agreements and bylaws. The evidence
suggests an increasing reliance on shareholders’ agreements to coordinate joint control and to
bind directors’ votes. I also find a growing adoption of anti-takeover devices in bylaws.
Finally, this paper sheds light on the incentives that may alter preferences of controlling
shareholders. This discussion also explains why controlling shareholders opt to create greater
diversity of ownership structures. This analysis advances our knowledge of corporate
structures in other emerging countries.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance scholars have recently begun to analyze publicly held
corporations that have controlling shareholders.1 Controlling shareholders are the most
common distribution of corporate ownership outside of the United States and the United
Kingdom.2 They are prevalent in continental Europe,3 and especially in developing
countries in Asia4 and Latin America5.
Scholars have attempted to explain the prevalence of large shareholders in these
countries.6 An important body of literature has shown that the extraction of private
1

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1652 (2006) (surveying this literature); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003); and Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange __ (ECGI Law
Working Paper Group, Paper No. 79, 2007).
2 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 498 (1999) (“If we look at the largest firms in the world and use a very tough
definition of control, dispersed ownership is about as common as family control. But if we move from
there to medium-sized firms, to a more lenient definition of control, and to countries with poor investor
protection, widely held firms become an exception. Berle and Means have created an accurate image of
ownership of large American corporations, but it is far from a universal image.”).
3
See, e.g., Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD __ (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); Alexander Aganin & Paolo
Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND
THE WORLD __ (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); and Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, Voting Control in
German Corporations, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. __ (2003). See also Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The
Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002). (showing that family
ownership is more common than widely held ownership in continental Europe); and MARCO BECHT,
ARIANE CHAPELLE & LUE RENNEBOOK, SHAREHOLDERING CASCADES: THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL IN BELGIUM IN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (F. Barca, M. Becht,
ed. 2000).
4
See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in
East Asia Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 92-93 (2000) (demonstrating that more than two-thirds of
public corporations in East Asia have controlling shareholders, most of whom represent family-owned
companies).
5
See, e.g., Richard A. Price, Francisco J. Roman & Brian Robert Rountree, Governance Reform, Share
Concentration and Financial Reporting Transparency in Mexico (April 7, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=897811. See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at __
(showing that virtually all Mexican and Argentinian corporations are controlled by few wealthy families).
6
See, e.g., Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders, supra note 1, at __; and Stijn Claessens, Simeon
Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of
Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002) (finding that there are incentive and entrenchment effects of
large share ownership. The former refers to increases in firm value in connection with the cash-flow
ownership of the largest shareholders, and the latter refers to decreases in firm value that occur when
control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership).
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benefits of control is a key reason why these shareholders maintain corporate control.7
Related works have proposed several hypotheses to explain why private benefits of
control are large in certain countries and small in others.8
Even though this literature has advanced our understanding of corporate
governance structures, there remains a serious gap in our knowledge. We still do not
understand the dynamics of changes in patterns of ownership. While we know why most
corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, we must
investigate how concentrated ownership can transform into dispersed ownership or how
ownership change operates in practice.
This gap exists partially because ownership patterns do not change very quickly
or often. As Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North argued, institutional change is slow
and path dependent in nature.9 However, there are examples we can look to.
There are two countries where concentrated ownership has transformed into
dispersed ownership: the United States and the United Kingdom. Scholars have already
debated the causes that led to such change.10

But this debate is advantaged and

disadvantaged because these countries already consolidated their ownership change
process before they became subject to scholarly inquiry.11
One advantage is that it is certain that the US and the UK are species of the
dispersed ownership genre. They are success stories of corporate ownership change.12

7

See, e.g., Lucian A Bebchuk, A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control __ (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Group, Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203.
8 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A
Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001); and Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).
9 Douglass North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). See
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,
52. L. REV. 127 (1999) (elaborating the argument of path dependence in relation to corporate ownership
structures).
10
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76 (2001); and Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter?
The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469 (2001).
11
Cheffins, supra note 10, at __ (noting that Berle and Means argued that dispersed ownership was the
predominant type of ownership in the US in early 1930s).
12
See Marco Becht & J. Bradford Delong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?, in A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (commenting
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So the study of these cases bears a certainty that does not exist when one analyzes initial
stages of ownership change which may be instable. For example, researchers report that
some countries, such as Canada, Germany and Japan, experienced temporary ownership
dispersion that soon reverted to traditional concentrated ownership.13 In contrast, the
United States and the United Kingdom have successfully surpassed the instability
inherent to economic change and now present well-defined dispersed ownership patterns.
Moreover, enough time has passed from the time both countries experienced initial
changes in ownership structures to allow a more comprehensive investigation about the
variables that may have brought about ownership change.
On the other hand, there are disadvantages from using the United States and
United Kingdom as ownership change benchmarks. Because ownership change has
already been consolidated, scholars cannot accurately assess which variables mattered
most at the beginning of the process. So, there are competing theories that attempt to
explain what happened first: dispersion of ownership or investor protection. La Porta et
al. argue that formal laws protecting investors and proper enforcement are a precondition
for pulverizing share ownership and developing capital markets.14 In contrast, Coffee and
Cheffins contend that the development of capital markets occurred without such formal
laws.15 Accordingly, we do not have a clear picture of the turning point that caused the
change or development of each phase of the process. Experiencing the change at the
present moment offers the opportunity to accurately map out these phases and major
events.
This paper aims at analyzing the micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership
structures. It investigates a unique, contemporaneous event. This event refers to a
that America’s response to the Great Depression was to destroy family capitalism).
13 See, e.g., Randall K. Morck, Michael Percy, Gloria Y. Tian & Bernard Yeung, The Rise and Fall of the
Widely Held Firm, in A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (discussing the upheaval and decline of
freestanding widely held firms in Canada); Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in
Germany, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed.
2005); and Randall K. Morck & Masao Nakamura, A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean. A
History of Corporate Ownership in Japan, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE
WORLD 613 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005).
14 La Porta et. al., supra note 8, at 7.
15
Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 76; and Cheffins, supra note 10, at 469. See also Julian Franks, Colin
Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time With the Family. The Decline of Family Ownership in the
United Kingdom, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613 (Randall Morck,
ed. 2005)
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process of change in patterns of ownership in Brazil, where corporations have historically
been characterized by severely concentrated ownership.16 These concentrated ownership
patterns have recently diluted, indicating an early stage of diffused ownership.17 Based
on this evidence of ownership change, this paper contributes to the corporate governance
literature by inquiring how and why ownership structures change.
This case study also adds to the literature on controlling shareholders. Recent
articles have called attention to the taxonomy of controlling shareholders types,
proposing that the simple taxonomy distinguishing between countries with controlling
shareholder systems and widely held shareholder systems is unrefined.18 According to
this view, controlling shareholders structures are more nuanced: they can vary from
efficient to inefficient structures with controlling shareholders who extract pecuniary or
nonpecuniary private benefits of control.19
Brazil is usually classified as a system with inefficient controlling shareholders
receiving both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.20 Investigating recent conditions
leading Brazilian concentrated ownership to become dispersed therefore illuminates the
incentives that may alter the preferences of controlling shareholders. Additionally, this
discussion allows us to understand why controlling shareholders may opt for a greater
diversity of ownership structures. It then enable us to draw comparisons and make
deductions that can enrich the comparative corporate governance debate and advance our
knowledge of corporate structures in other emerging countries.

16
17
18

See notes accompanying text infra Section IV.
See evidence infra Section V.

Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1643.
at 1652, 1661.
20
See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J.
FIN. 537, 539 (2004) (finding that private benefits of control are worth 65% of the equity value of a firm in
Brazil); and Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2001) (noting that private benefits of control in Brazil are 16% to 23% of a
company’s market value). See generally Érica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study
of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 803 (2006) (discussing controlling shareholders in Brazil).
19 Id.
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I.1. A CASE STUDY OF CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP PATTERNS

Brazil traditionally had capital markets that could not sufficiently finance
corporations because of high discounts applied to security prices.21 Brazilian firms were
characterized by strong ownership concentration22 and weak corporate governance.23
Family tycoons typically retained ownership of voting shares,24 and extracted very high
private benefits from control of the corporations.25 Boards were comprised entirely or
almost entirely of representatives of the controlling family or group or insiders.26
Yet new developments in Brazilian capital markets seem to challenge the
traditional model. Firms have been looking for equity financing in the market.27 The
number of listed companies in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has risen.28
Firms are adhering to higher standards of corporate governance29 through migration to
Bovespa’s special listing segments.30 The number of IPOs has increased tremendously.31

21

See Maria Helena Santana, Case study on the Novo Mercado (NM) of Sao Paolo Stock Exchange
(Bovespa) (2007), forthcoming in Focus series of Global Corporate Governance Forum, World Bank, at 8-9
(arguing that discount in shares prices was considered the most important factor for a company’s lack of
interest in the stock market); and Tatiana Nenova, Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in
Brazil__
(EFMA
London
Meetings,
2002),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294064 (measuring price difference between
controlling and non-controlling shares and finding that the market applies a discount to non-controlling
shares). See also David M. Trubek, Law, Planning, and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market:
A Study of Law in Economic Change 48-49 (Yale Law School Studies in Law and Modernization No. 3,
April 1971), available at __ (discussing the failure of strategies that the government sought to adopt to deal
with depressed stock prices in the early beginnings of private capital markets).
22
See infra Section IV and notes.
23 See generally Gorga, supra note 20 (discussing corporate governance failures in Brazil).
24
Id. (discussing family ownership in Brazil).
25
See generally Dyck & Zingales, supra note 20, and Nenova, supra note 20. See also Rafael La Porta,
Simeon Djankov, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing
25 (NBER Working Paper Group, Paper No. W11883, Dec. 2005) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875734 (stating that block premium is very high in Brazil, amounting to 49%).
26
See Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & Érica Gorga, An Overview of Brazilian Corporate
Governance, (U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper. Paper No. 109) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003059 (examining board corporate governance practices in Brazil).
27
See, e.g., Dinheiro mais barato para as empresas. Com anos de atraso, as companhias brasileiras
começam a ter opção de financiamento fora dos bancos [Cheaper Finance for Firms. With a Delay of One
Hundred Years, Brazilian Companies Start to Have Financing Alternatives Outside Banks], REVISTA
EXAME, Apr. 25, 2005.
28
See infra Table 2.
29
See Table 2 infra Section II and Table 1.
30
See infra Table 7.
31
See infra Table 5.
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The stock market has seen the first attempt of a hostile takeover in thirty years.32
Companies have been selling control in the market,33 and anti takeover defenses are being
incorporated into companies’ bylaws.34 In addition to these company-related
developments, Bovespa recently merged with the Brazilian Exchange for Future
Contracts and Commodities (“BM&F”) and became the world’s third largest stock
exchange.35
This phenomenon has received significant attention from the media. Several
articles have pointed out that the Brazilian capital market is experiencing unprecedented
momentum.

They have specially focused on the so-called trend towards dispersed

ownership.36 According to these commentators, Brazil is finally experiencing a transition
in ownership patterns.

Some hypothesize that ownership diffusion may result in

Brazilian managerial control becoming more like its American counterpart.37
Scholars have not yet analyzed this phenomenon.

Nonetheless, these recent

developments present a very interesting opportunity for research. If ownership patterns
are indeed shifting, we need to understand how and why ownership structure is changing.

32

Discussed infra Section V.1.
See, e.g., Dasa vai pulverizar o controle acionário em bolsa [Dasa Will Diffuse Stock Control in the
Stock Exchange], VALOR ECONÔMICO, Jan. 25, 2006; Perdigão pulveriza capital e entra na onda das
companhias públicas [Perdigão Diffuses Capital and Get into the Wave of Public Companies], VALOR
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 17, 2006; and Empresas sem dono [Firms Without Owners]. REVISTA EXAME, Jan. 26,
2006.
34
Vitamina ou veneno? Enquanto a Europa discute os prós e contras das poison pills, o Brasil desenvolve
versões próprias da pílula e reforça a dose quando o controle é pulverizado [Vitamin or poison? While
Europe Discusses the Pros and Cons of Poison Pills, Brazil Develops Its Own Pill Versions and Reinforces
the Dose When Control Is Diffused], REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO, Mar. 2006.
35
Heloiza Canassa & Edgar Ortega, Bovespa-BM&F Merger to Create Third-Biggest Exchange,
Bloomberg,
03/26/3008
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=abTHmx9GUGwA&refer=news.
36
See supra note 11; A vida depois da pulverização. Empresas que já optaram pela diluição de controle
têm aumento de liquidez em seus papéis e passam a fazer parte dos principais índices [Life After Diffusion
of Shares. Companies that Have Chosen Diffusion of Control Have Liquidity Increase for Their Securities
and Become Part of the Main Index], VALOR ECONÔMICO, June 29, 2006; and Para Previ, pulverização de
controle valoriza governança [For Previ, Control Pulverization Enhances Governance], VALOR
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 18, 2006.
37
See Empresas sem dono [Firms Without Owners]. REVISTA EXAME, Jan. 26, 2006; and Controle
pulverizado cria grupo de executivos superpoderosos. Modelo exige mais participação dos acionistas e
atenção aos conflitos de interesse [Diffused Control Creates A Group of Super Powerful Executives. The
Model Requires More Shareholder Participation and Attention to Conflict of Interests], VALOR
ECONÔMICO, Mar. 13, 2006.
33

8

To investigate changes in Brazilian ownership structures, this paper analyzes data
on ownership structure of Brazilian listed corporations using Annual Information Reports
for the year 2006 and updated in 2007. To determine whether concentrated ownership
has been decreasing recently, I compare data obtained from this research with results of
previous studies on ownership structures from 1996 to 200238. I analyze emerging types
of control structures in association with less concentration of ownership, inquiring
whether firms present minority control or eventually managerial control.
In addition to establishing whether ownership has become more dispersed,
assessing whether shareholders have changed enables us to understand developments in
corporate governance. Do profiles of the largest stockholders look the same as they used
to? Has family ownership dissipated? Has institutional investor ownership increased?
To answer these questions, this paper identifies changes in the profiles of majority
shareholders. I compare this data with results obtained by previous studies and conclude
that, differently than one may expect, no relevant change in the profile of shareholders
has occurred. Family ownership is still a dominant feature of Brazilian corporations, but
there have been other significant developments in ownership structures. For example,
government ownership has considerably lessened and institutional investors ownership
seems to be increasing.
This paper finds that managerial control is far from being a Brazilian reality. But
this paper presents evidence that concentration of ownership has indeed diminished in
Brazilian capital markets.

There is, however, one important caveat: ownership has

become more “dispersed” in Novo Mercado, the special listing segment of Bovespa that
requires that firms adopt the one-share-one-vote rule. I find that the largest shareholder
of Novo Mercado companies holds 36.39% of the shares on average. This data greatly
contrasts with measures of the largest stake of shares from previous studies.39 When we
move from Novo Mercado to Level 2 and Level 1, segments with less stringent
requirements of corporate governance, we find that ownership becomes increasingly
more concentrated. The average of the largest shareholder ownership is 64.79% and
63.14% in Level 2 and Level 1, respectively.
38
39

See references infra Section IV.
See notes infra Section IV.
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It may appear as though companies have been changing their governance and
ownership patterns in the ways envisioned by Novo Mercado.40 However, this paper
argues that this conclusion is, at best, incomplete. For a complete understanding of these
current changes, any account must analyze the players who have been changing corporate
governance patterns.
This paper analyzes the historical background of all the firms that have listed on
Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1. I identify the companies that have migrated from
Bovespa’s traditional listing market to a special segment (Novo Mercado, Level 2 or
Level 1). One could suppose that firms have been scaling-up from the standard listing
segment to Level 1, Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado to take advantage of the
heightened value of their securities in most stringent segments.41 One could even assume
that most firms that are listed now in Novo Mercado used to be listed on the traditional
segment. However, the reality is that few companies from the traditional listing market
have migrated to Novo Mercado. Only 15.2% of the firms listed on Novo Mercado come
from the standard market. The majority of companies (thirty-five out of fifty-seven or
61.4%) that originally migrated from the standard market went to Level 1.42
In contrast, the majority of companies that have been listing in Novo Mercado are
mostly “new entrants.”

Nearly 85% of Novo Mercado’s firms are closely held

40

See Affonso Celso Pastore, Síndrome de Peter Pan: argumentos adicionais [Peter Pan Syndrome:
Additional
Arguments],
VALOR
ONLINE,
Sept.
10,
2007,
available
at
http://www.valoreconomico.com.br/valoreconomico/285/primeirocaderno/opiniao/Sindrome+de+Peter+Pa
n+argumentos+adicionais,,,58,4522835.html?highlight=&newsid=4522835&areaid=58&editionid=1855;
and Cristiano Romero, A decolagem do mercado de capitais [Taking off of the Capital Markets], VALOR
ECONÔMICO, Jan. 3, 2007. See also Temporada de compras [Buying Season], REVISTA EXAME, Nov. 16
2006.
41 See Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can a Stock Exchange Improve Corporate
Behavior? Evidence from Firm´s Migration to Premium Listings in Brazil __ (Jan. 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282. See also Ricardo P.C. Leal & Andre Carvalhal-da-Silva, Corporate
Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile) __ (Oct. 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=726261 (finding strong evidence that good corporate governance leads to a higher
market valuation and lower cost of capital). See generally Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love, & Andrei
Rachinsky, Corporate Governance and Firms' Market Values: Time Series Evidence from Russia, 7
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW 361-79 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=866988 (finding that
governance predicts market value in a firm fixed effects framework in Russia); Bernard S. Black &
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firms' Market Values? Evidence
from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914440 (noting that
investors consider Clause 49’s corporate governance reforms in India valuable, as large firms’ share prices
react positively to reform announcements).
42
See infra Section II and Table 1.
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corporations that have gone public and issued shares directly in this listing segment. This
suggests that we can identify two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets. One
world consists of new corporations which adopt better corporate governance patterns; the
other, traditional corporations which have not changed their main patterns of corporate
governance or ownership. So, while new entrants increase corporate governance quality
and market competition, a significant group of corporations resist changes and act as path
dependence theory would predict.43
The new entrants are, on their own, changing the market as more dispersed
ownership patterns produce important consequences in corporate control and governance.
This paper, accordingly, discusses the consequences of this phenomenon on Brazilian
corporate governance and legal regulations.
One by-product of dispersed ownership is minority control, which is posing new
issues for the management of corporations. In response, Brazilian companies have begun
relying heavily on shareholder agreements. Main shareholders use these agreements to
coordinate corporate decision-making and exercise of control. My goal is to identify the
effects that shareholders agreements produce on corporate control. I survey shareholders’
agreements of all firms with dispersed control disclosed in 2006-2007 Annual
Information Reports (IANs) to Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM)–the Brazilian
Securities Exchange Commission. This is the first work I am aware of to assess how
shareholders’ agreements interfere in corporate governance.

Corporate governance

scholars usually restrict their analyses to companies’ charters and bylaws. Analysis of
shareholders’ agreements in Brazil reveals that the contractual relations that affect
corporate governance may be more complex than generally assumed. Thus, this article
contributes to corporate governance literature by showing that shareholders’ agreements
are a very important piece of the governance puzzle that researchers try to figure out.
A second development refers to changes in companies’ bylaws.

Many

corporations are adopting legal mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovers. Renner and
Perdigao were the first companies to include anti-takeover in their bylaws.44 I investigate
43

Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 9, at 137-38.
See Adversários de primeira viagem. Oferta hostil da Sadia pelo controle da Perdigão deixa espaço
para os administradores brasileiros agirem com muito mais governança da próxima vez [First Trip

44
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eighty-four companies without a clear controlling shareholder to assess how diluted
ownership has led to the use of anti-takeover clauses in bylaws.
After analyzing how ownership patterns have been changing and the
consequences of this process, this paper discusses why this change has taken place. This
paper then considers the Brazilian experience to suggest how dispersed ownership has
been promoted and how the law, the State, and private players supported this
development. I then build on empirical evidence from Brazil to advance theoretical
understanding of changes in corporate ownership structures in emerging countries. In
addition, I highlight several problems regulators will face in strengthening Brazilian
capital markets.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I identify recent changes in the
Brazilian market following the creation of Bovespa’s listing segments.

I show a

consistent increase in the number of IPOs and the numbers of the new listing
phenomenon. In Section III, I analyze what companies have migrated to Novo Mercado,
Level 2, and Level 1.

In Section IV, I review empirical evidence of ownership

concentration in the Brazilian capital markets. In Section V, I discuss the recent takeover
attempt and present new data on the decrease of ownership concentration. I examine
patterns of ownership in Bovespa’s corporate governance segments and find that
dispersed ownership is present in Novo Mercado and not in Level 2 and Level 1. Section
VI then explores the main consequences of increased dispersion of ownership on private
contracting. Section VII matches empirical evidence with theoretical hypotheses on
changes of corporate ownership and highlights lessons we can learn from the Brazilian
experience. It identifies the reasons for and consequences of ownership change on other
emerging markets. Section VIII discusses challenges that Brazilian regulation will have
to face to sustain market development. Section IX concludes.

Adversaries; and Sadia’s Hostile Offer for Perdigao’s Control Leaves Room For Brazilian Managers to Act
with More Governance Next Time], REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO, Aug. 2006.
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II. RECENT MARKET DEVELOPMENTS: SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS, LISTING
EVOLUTION AND IPOS

Bovespa, the main stock exchange in Brazil, launched three special listing
segments in December of 2000: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado. These segments
were intended to enhance companies’ securities prices and attract investors to the market
by fostering transparency and confidence in the stock market. To list in these segments,
companies must comply with disclosure requirements and corporate governance practices
stricter than those required by Brazilian legislation. Because the standard trading market
continues to exist, firms voluntarily choose to migrate to the special segments.
Table 1 details the most important rules of the special listing segments. Level 1
basically requires: 1) a maintenance of free-float of at least 25% of the total capital, 2)
improvements in quarterly information reports, including disclosure of consolidated
financial statements, cash flow statement, and special audit revision, 3) disclosure of an
annual calendar of corporate events, 4) disclosure of trading involving securities of the
company by its management or controlling shareholder, and 5) disclosure of contracts
between the company and related-parties.
Level 2 mandates compliance with Level 1’s rules and the following regulations:
1) disclosure of financial statements in accordance with US GAAP or IFRS standards, 2)
a unified term of two years at maximum for the entire board of the directors, which must
be comprised by at least five members, from which 20% must be independent, 3) voting
rights granted to non-voting (preferred) shares in certain corporate decisions such as
merger, spin-off, or incorporation, approval of contracts between the company and other
firms of the same holding group when deliberation occurs at the general meeting, 4) tag
along rights for non-voting shareholders who ought to receive at least 80% of the price
paid for the voting shares of the controlling shareholder in a sale of control, 5) obligation
to hold a tender offer by the economic value of the shares in case of delisting or goingprivate transaction, and 6) adherence to the Market Arbitration Panel for the solution of
corporate disputes.
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Novo Mercado requires compliance with Level 1’s and Level 2’s standards and
the following rules: 1) all shares must be voting shares, and 2) tag along rights for all
minority shareholders who must receive the same price paid for the shares of the
controlling shareholder.
All three segments require that public share offerings use mechanisms favoring
capital dispersion and broader retail access. While this rule can be interpreted in very
different ways,45 it is clear that the one-share-one-vote rule best enables ownership to
become dispersed. This rule is only required by Novo Mercado. Therefore, Novo
Mercado is the most stringent listing segment, followed by Level 2 and Level 1, the least
stringent segment.
Table 2 displays information on listing evolution in Bovespa’s segments. In the
first three years of existence, the market did not respond as expected.

By the end of

2003, there were only two companies listed on Novo Mercado and three companies listed
on Level 2. Level 1 already had thirty-one companies, but no clear pattern emerged
because Level 1 was not considered to require a great change in corporate governance
standards. Then, slowly in 2004, the situation began to change. The boom came in 2006.
At the end of this year, there were forty-four companies listed on Novo Mercado and
fourteen on Level 2. Interestingly, Level 1 did not share the same growth rate. By the
end of 2006, Level 1 listed thirty-seven companies, a slight increase from 2003. The
Novo Mercado’s boom continued through the end of 2007 and the adhesion rate more
than doubled during this period, making a total of ninety-two listed companies. Level 2
did not benefit from the same evolution and grouped twenty companies for the same time
frame. Level 1 also obtained just few more companies, forty-four in all.
Novo Mercado’s firms have been responsible for the large growth in the number
of IPOs in Bovespa. Table 5 presents the numbers of the IPO phenomenon for primary
offerings, secondary offerings and mixed offerings. I focus on the numbers of primary
and mixed offerings (these also include a primary initial public offering). In 2004, only
three companies engaged in IPOs in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level 2. In
45

The specific criteria required by Bovespa to meet this rule are: (i) ensured access to all interested
investors and (ii) allocation of at least 10% of the total distribution to individuals or non-institutional
investors. (See Rule 7.1 of Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado.)
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2005, five companies in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level 2 went public. The
number of IPOs dramatically increased in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, seventeen IPOs were
conducted in Novo Mercado and four in Level 2. In 2007, the numbers jumped to fortyone IPOs in Novo Mercado, seven in Level 2, and eight in Level 1.
Table 6 shows that Novo Mercado has been receiving the vast majority of the
new IPOs. Novo Mercado already represents 18.59% of the market capitalization of
Bovespa. Level 2 does much worse than this score. Nonetheless, the largest market
capitalization of the new listing segments comes from Level 1, which makes
approximately 38%, more than two times the market capitalization of Novo Mercado.
Overall, the largest capitalization of Bovespa still comes from the standard market,
which accounts for little more market capitalization than Level 1, accounting for
approximately 40% of the total market capitalization of the stock exchange.
Analyzing this data, we can foresee that Level 1 will surpass the standard market
in terms of market capitalization. However, this is less likely to happen with Novo
Mercado, if most traditional Brazilian firms continue to adhere to Level 1.

III. THE COMPANIES LISTED ON BOVESPA’S NOVO MERCADO, LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 1,
AND THEIR MIGRATION PATTERNS

By the end of 2007, Bovespa had 156 companies listed on its special segments of
corporate governance (ninety-two in Novo Mercado, twenty in Level 2 and forty-four in
Level 1).46 These numbers present a notable development considering the historical
evolution of Brazilian capital markets.

As a result, many commentators are very

optimistic about the recent growth of the market.
These developments can imply several hypotheses about stock market and
corporate governance evolution. Recent studies show that Novo Mercado’s firms receive

46

Based on data gathered by the end of 2007.
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higher prices for their securities.47 These prices should encourage firms to upgrade their
listing level, since firms can more easily obtain financing by enacting stricter corporate
governance practices. Therefore, one could suppose that firms that used to be listed on
the standard market should gradually scale-up from this market to Level 1, Level 2, and
then to Novo Mercado. One could hypothesize that the majority of firms that are listed
now in Novo Mercado came from the traditional segment. However, a careful analysis of
which companies have been listing on Novo Mercado does not support these hypotheses.
In this Section, I identify the companies listed on Novo Mercado and the dates
when their shares began to be traded in this segment. Then, I inquire whether these
companies had been previously listed on the Bovespa standard market, Level 2 or Level
1. For this purpose, I checked the dates of their registration with CVM, to assess when
these companies opened their capital and whether they had done so in Bovespa’s standard
market. Phone calls have been conducted to clarify doubts when the data was found
insufficient to determine whether the company had been listed on the standard market.
To date, Bovespa has ninety-two companies listed on Novo Mercado.48 Table 7
shows that, of these companies, only fifteen companies, or approximately 16.3% of all
Novo Mercado’s companies, migrated from the traditional market. These companies
include: Banco Brasil SA, Cia Hering, Cia Saneamento Basico Est Sao Paulo, CPFL
Energia SA, Drogasil SA, Eternit SA, Gafisa SA, Industrias Romi SA, Light SA, Lojas
Renner SA, Perdigao SA, Rossi Residencial SA, Sao Carlos Empreendimentos e
Participacoes SA, Tractebel Energia SA and Weg S.A. Therefore, the vast majority of
Novo Mercado companies are new entrants that have listed their IPOs in Novo Mercado.
There are twenty companies listed on Level 2. From these companies, eight
firms (40%) have already been listed on the traditional market.

These include All

América Latina Logística SA, Centrais Eletricas de Santa Catarina SA, Eletropaulo
Metrop. Elet. Sao Paulo SA, Marcopolo SA, Net Sevicos de Comunicação SA, Saraiva
47

See, e.g., Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Corporate Governance
Quality and Firm Value in Brazil __ (June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923310; and
Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary Market Reforms Promote Efficient
Corporate Governance? Evidence from Firms' Migration to Premium Markets in Brazil __ (Jan. 25, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282.
48
Based on data collected at the end of 2007.
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SA Livreiros Editores, Suzano Petroquímica SA and Tam SA. This information shows
that although the majority of firms listed on Level 2 are new entrants in the stock
exchange, a significant number of firms have migrated from the standard market.
Bovespa has now forty-four companies listed on Level 1. Thirty-five of these
companies, or approximately 80% of all companies listed on Level 1, come from
Bovespa’s traditional listing market. These include: Aracruz Celulose SA, Bco Bradesco
SA, Bco Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Banco Itau Holding Finaceira SA,
Parapanapanema SA, Brasil Telecom Participacoes SA, Brasil Telecom SA, Braskem
SA, Centrais Elet Bras SA Eletrobras, Cia Energetica de Sao Paulo (CESP), Cia
Brasileira de Distribuicao, Cia Energetica de Minas Gerais (CEMIG), Cia Fiacao Tecidos
Cedro Cachoeira, Cia Transmissao Energia Elet Paulista, Cia Vale do Rio Doce, Confab
Industrial SA, Duratex SA, Fras-Le SA, Gerdau SA, Iochpe Maxion SA, Itausa
Investimentos Itau SA, Klabin SA, Mangels Industrial SA, Metalurgica Gerdau SA,
Randon SA Implementos e Participacoes, SA Fabrica de Prods Alimenticios Vigor, Sadia
SA, Sao Paulo Alpargatas SA, Suzano Papel e Celulose SA, Ultrapar Participacoes SA,
Unibanco Holdings SA, Unibanco Uniao de Bcos Brasileiros SA, Unipar Uniao de Ind
Petroq SA, Usinas Sid de Minas Gerais SA (USIMINAS), and Votorantim Celulose e
Papel SA. Traditional firms are more likely to gravitate towards segments that require
small changes in corporate governance.
Several factors explain the migration patterns of firms from the standard market
to Level 1. First, these firms tend to be large, established, and successful corporations.
They can rely on internal or governmental financing or on financing from other
institutions with which they have continuous businesses. Therefore, they can resolve
capital shortage without depending on the capital market.

Second, the controlling

shareholders of these corporations are the wealthiest families in Brazil and they carry
political influence. Therefore, extracting non-pecuniary, and perhaps pecuniary, private
benefits of control may be an important reason why they maintain control. Third, Novo
Mercado and Level 2 lessen corporate control because their additional disclosure
requirements and, for Novo Mercado companies, the one-share-one-vote rule.
Complying with these rules may conflict with the interests of important controlling
shareholders. Thus, consistent with path dependence hypothesis, we find that, traditional
17

firms that migrate most likely list on Level 1, which requires the least stringent changes
in their initial ownership and governance structure.
At this point, there is insufficient data to suggest that traditional market firms are
gradually migrating to Level 1, to Level 2, and then to Novo Mercado. Only four
companies improved their corporate governance using this kind of step-by-step approach.
Eternit SA went from the traditional market to Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado. Cia
Hering, Perdigao SA and Weg SA left the traditional market for Level 1 and then for
Novo Mercado.

Two other companies, Net Servicos de Comunicao and Rossi

Residencial SA, had their IPOs in Level 1 before migrating to Novo Mercado.
In toto, the listing and migration patterns support three conclusions. First, new
entrants comprise the vast majority of Novo Mercado firms. They likely utilize capital
markets as an alternative for raising capital. Therefore, they are the largely responsible
for the growth in Bovespa’s IPOs market.
Second, Level 2 represents the compromise between the strongest corporate
governance practices of Novo Mercado and the weakest of Level 1. I believe that
precisely because of this gray compliance with better corporate governance, Level 2 is
the segment that has attracted the smallest number of listings. Level 2 mostly contains
new entrants, but it has a significantly greater percentage of firms from the standard
market.

All companies listed on Level 2 have non-voting preferred shares in their

structures, which explains why they have not listed on Novo Mercado. Some of Level
2’s companies suffer from regulatory restrictions due to the type of industry in which
they operate.

This happens, for instance, with companies in the business of air

transportation and education. Such regulation constrains the possibility of converting
non-voting shares into voting shares, therefore impeding companies from complying with
Novo Mercado’s one share-one vote rule.49
49 These are the cases of Anhanguera Educacional Participacoes S.A., Estacio Participacoes S.A., Kroton
Educacional S.A., and SEB – Sistema Educional Brasileiro S.A. Air transportation firms, according to Law
7565/86, art 181 II must have four-fifths of the voting capital pertaining to Brazilian citzens. In addition,
article 181 §1º requires that firms’ bylaws prohibit the conversion of preferred non-voting shares into
voting shares. In the case of companies that provide educational services, a law still pending in Congress
has constrained the ownership structure ex-ante the IPO period. Article 7 of Project of Law No. XX
mandates that 70% of the voting capital of any institution that sponsors universities should belong to
Brazilian citzens. Educational firms that recently went public arranged their ownership structure
accordingly, issuing units, which are comprised of non-voting shares and voting shares.
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Third, Level 1 is the segment that contains the largest number of firms that
migrated from the standard market. Level 1 contains very traditional Brazilian firms with
very strong reputations. These firms account for the largest market capitalization of the
special segments. Controlling shareholders have chosen to comply with weak corporate
governance practices that permit them to continue to extract pecuniary and non pecuniary
private benefits of control. These firms have additional financing sources due to their
strong political connections and reputations. Path dependence also explains why most
migrating traditional firms enter the segment that requires the least demanding changes in
corporate governance, enabling them to preserve most of their initial ownership and
governance structures.

IV. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP PATTERNS

Several studies have shown concentrated ownership characterizes Brazilian
publicly-held companies. For example, Valadares and Leal found that, on average, one
shareholder owned 74% of the voting capital in 203 companies, or 62.5% of their
sample.50 They relied on data disclosed in the 1996 IANs. Their sample comprised
ownership information on 325 companies, including twenty-six financial institutions.51
Among 122 companies whose control is not retained by one sole shareholder, the largest
shareholder owns, on average, 32% of the voting capital. Therefore, a shareholder will
retain a major voting block of shares even in companies without a controlling shareholder.
Considering the entire sample, the largest shareholder owns, on average, 58% of the
voting capital, the three largest shareholders own 78%, and the five largest own 82%.
Only thirty-five companies, or 11% of the sample, have not issued non-voting shares.
Valadares and Leal find that the total capital of companies is composed, on average, by
54% voting shares and 46% non-voting shares. So, non-voting shares have been used as a

50

Sílvia Mourthé Valadares & Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal, Ownership and control structure of Brazilian
companies 8 (2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=213409.
51
Id. at ___.
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mechanism to separate ownership from control.52
Confirming these findings, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal’s study on a sample of
225 companies based on the IANs of 2000 showed that 90% of the sample had a
shareholder owning more than 50% of the voting shares. This shareholder retained, on
average, 76% of the voting capital and 54% of the total capital of the firm. Twenty-two
companies did not have a controlling shareholder, and the largest shareholder held, on
average, 37% of the voting capital.

On average, taking the entire sample into

consideration, the largest shareholder owns 72% of the voting capital, the three and the
five largest shareholders own 85% and 87% of the voting rights respectively.53 Thus, the
total capital of the companies is composed, on average, by 53% of voting shares and 47%
of non-voting shares.54
Considering capital origin, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal observed that, of the 203
companies which had a sole controlling shareholder, one hundred eight companies (48%
of the sample) are controlled by families, sixty companies (27%) are controlled by
foreign investors, nineteen (8%) by institutional investors, and sixteen (7%) by the
government.55
Aldrighi and Oliveira analyzed ownership and control concentration, relying on
IANS dated between 1997 to 2002.56 They show that 77.3 % of listed companies have a

52
Id. at 10 (“[I]f there is some diffusion in ownership of the firm, this occurs through non-voting shares.
Thus small shareholders normally do not have voting rights, and therefore lack the formal power to
guarantee their rights from company managers.”)
53
André Carvalhal-da-Silva & Ricardo Leal, Corporate governance, market valuation and dividend policy
in Brazil 7 (Coppead Working Paper Series, Paper No. 390, Nov. 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=477302. See also Eduardo Schiehll & Igor Oliveira dos Santos, Ownership
structure of boards of directors: Evidence on Brazilian publicly-traded companies, Revista de
Administração, São Paulo, vol. 39, n. 4, out.dez./ 2004, p. 381 (analyzing data from 2002 and concluding
that “[o]verall, these statistics document that the ownership structure of Brazilian public firms has not
changed significantly since 1998 and remains highly concentrated.”).
54
Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, supra note 53, at 9.
55
Id. at 8, 10-13. The authors support their hypothesis that a higher concentration of voting rights is
associated with a lower firm valuation, that the higher the voting total capital ratio, the lower is the firm
valuation, that firms with a high concentration of voting rights have a low payout, and that firms with a
high separation between voting and cash flow rights have a low payout.
56
Dante Mendes Aldrighi & Alessandro Vinícius Marques de Oliveira, The Influence of Ownership and
Control Structures on the Firm Performance: Evidence from Brazil __ (Mar. 15, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=972615 (also finding evidence on minority expropriation by controlling
shareholders, mainly in the case of pyramids and non-voting shares structures which are associated with
negative impacts on the performance of the largest firms).
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controlling shareholder.

Of those companies, 31.8% have a controlling shareholder

owning more than 90% of the firm’s voting capital. The largest ultimate shareholder
retains, on average, 70.7% of the voting rights of listed companies and 46.4% of the cashflows rights.

The discrepancy between voting rights and cash flows matches 24.3

percentage points.

The largest ultimate shareholder owns more than 50% of the

outstanding capital in 41.8% of the companies listed on Bovespa. In 29.2% of the
companies the largest ultimate shareholder holds cash-flow rights below 25%.
In a recent study, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva discovered a very high
concentration of voting rights leveraged by the use of indirect control structures and nonvoting shares.57 They studied ownership structures using IANs from approximately 250
firms in 1998, 2000 and 2002. They concluded that ownership of voting rights became
more concentrated during this period.58 They noted that controlling shareholders own
more than 50% of the voting shares in 75% of the companies.59
Thus, with respect to direct ownership, the largest shareholder has a median of
71% of the voting rights and 50% of the cash-flow rights. When indirect ownership is
analyzed, the largest shareholder has 68% of the voting rights and 34% of the cash flow
rights.60 These results demonstrate that the use of indirect control structures and nonvoting shares contribute to separation of ownership and control.61
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva also studied the identities of ultimate shareholders.
Their data for 2002 showed that 75.2% of the firms have indirect control structures and
21.5% of the companies have shareholders’ agreements among their largest shareholders.
After considering indirect control structures and terms of shareholders’ agreements, they
determined that 58.2% of the firms are ultimately owned by families, 24.9% by foreign
investors (individuals or entities), 8.9% institutional investors (insurance companies,

57

Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, supra note 41, at __.
Id. at 7.
59
Id. at 19.
60
Id. at __. It is important to note that the authors have already adjusted ownership concentration results to
reflect the voting blocks organized by means of shareholders’ agreements. See id. at 20 (making ownership
structures look much more concentrated than they actually are). I analyze ownership structures both with
and without taking shareholders’ agreements into account to compare the effects these agreements have on
ownership concentration and control in the market.
61
Id. at 20.
58
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pension funds, foundations or investment funds), and 8% by the government.62
Voting shares typically represented around 46.3% of the total number of shares in
the market. Forty-nine percent of all shares available for trading in the market, including
voting and non-voting shares, were free-floating shares. Non-voting shares used to be the
most liquid, representing about 90% of trading volume at the Bovespa Stock Exchange.63
Thus, the available studies on Brazilian ownership structures conclude that an
overwhelming majority of companies are controlled by a sole shareholder with
concentrated ownership of voting shares.

V.

TOWARDS DISPERSED OWNERSHIP?

This Section analyzes whether and to what extent ownership structures are becoming
more dispersed in Brazil. I begin with anecdotal evidence of Sadia S.A.’s attempted
takeover of Perdigao S.A.’s control. This case drew enormous media attention as it was
considered the first recent hostile takeover attempt in Brazilian capital markets.64

It

provided the first evidence of three interesting developments in corporate control and
governance structures: a) Perdigao’s significant dispersion of ownership by Brazilian
standards; b) its main shareholders’ adoption of a shareholders’ agreement to coordinate
control; and c) the current discussion on the adoption of tactical anti-takeover defenses.

V.1. THE RECENT TAKEOVER ATTEMPT

Sadia S.A. and Perdigão S.A. are the largest players in the Brazilian food
manufacturing business. They produce meat, chicken, pork, turkey and meat derivatives,
and process chilled frozen food such as pastas, poultry and vegetables. They are both
62

Id. at 20, 62.
Id. at __.
64
See Por que o negócio do ano não saiu [Why the Deal of the Year Did Not Go Through], REVISTA
EXAME, July 28, 2006 (stating that the Brazilian market has seen two other successful takeovers: the offer
of Companhia de Eletricidade de Juiz de Fora to acquire CEMIG in the 1970s and the takeover of Cimento
Aratu by Votorantim in the 1980s).
63
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importers and exporters of meat-based products. Sadia is listed on Bovespa’s Level 1.
Perdigão is listed on Novo Mercado.
In June 2006, Sadia attempted to expand its international business by taking over
Perdigão. Sadia offered to pay $27.88 per share.65 Sadia’s price was the average market
price of Perdigão’s shares at Bovespa in the 30 preceding days plus a premium of 35%.66
Perdigão’s executives found Sadia’s price too far below Perdigão’s value and
shareholders’ expectations. Perdigão’s board additionally believed that the offer did not
comply with procedures provided by Perdigão’s bylaws.67
The largest shareholders of Perdigão are eight pension funds: Previ, Petrus, Fapes,
Sistel, Valia, Real Grandeza Fundos de Previdência, Previ Banerj and PSPP. Most of
these funds engaged in a shareholders’ agreement regulating voting rights in the
company.68 They jointly own about 49% of Perdigão’s voting shares.69 The pension
funds designed a strategy to prevent the transaction by convincing Weg SA, a shareholder
owning approximately 5.88% of Perdigão’s shares, not to tender its shares. Because the
pension funds controlled a very high percentage of shares, they simply adopted the
strategy of saying “no.”70
Sadia then offered a new price of $29 per share71. This price was considered
below the legal requirement that a second offer be priced at least 5% higher than the first
offer72. Grouping 55.38% of Perdigão’s capital, the funds refused to tender their shares
and easily and quickly blocked the hostile takeover attempt.73

65Sadia

nega que tenha sido inábil quanto à Perdigão [Sadia Denies That It Was Inept Regarding
Perdigão], REVISTA EXAME, July 27, 2006.
66
Perdigão reclama da forma e do valor da investida feita pela Sadia [Perdigão Complains About the
Form and Value of Sadia’s Investiture] VALOR ECONÔMICO, July 18 2006.
67
Perdigão considera oferta da Sadia “abaixo do valor” de mercado [Perdigao Considers the Offer from
Sadia Below the Market Value], REVISTA EXAME, July 17, 2006.
68
Frustrada Sadia revê seus planos de expansão [Disappointed, Sadia Reviews Its Expansion Plans],
VALOR ECONÔMICO, July 24, 2006.
69
Em unanimidade, fundos dizem “não”[Unanimously, Funds Say No], VALOR ECONÔMICO, July 19, 2006.
70
Id.
71
Sadia aumenta oferta para comprar Perdigão [Sadia Raises the Offert to Acquire Perdigão], REVISTA
EXAME, July 20, 2006.
72
Por que o negócio do ano não saiu [Why the Deal of the Year Did Not Go Though], REVISTA EXAME,
July 28, 2006.
73 Caso Sadia-Perdigão é sinal de evolução do mercado [Sadia-Perdigao Case Is a Sign of Market
Evolution], VALOR ECONÔMICO, July 24, 2006.
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Many Brazilian companies are currently facing situations like Sadia’s hostile
takeover attempt. In 2006, Perdigão’s ownership structure was the following: Previ
(15.6%), Petrus (11.9%), Sistel (5.1%), Weg Participacoes e Servicos SA (5.1%), Valia
(4.1%), Fapes (3.6%), Real Grandeza Fundo de Previdencia (2.85), Fund. Inv. Tit e
Valores Mobiliarios Librium (2.2%), and Previ Banerj (1.2%).74

Considering share

ownership alone, no shareholder held a majority of the voting shares to control corporate
decisions in the general meeting or to elect the majority of the board. Though Previ and
Petrus are the largest two shareholders, other shareholders could still challenge their
power by acting as a homogeneous group.
Many minority shareholders have been coping with this situation through
shareholders’ agreements. This was indeed the case of Perdigão, whose shareholders
(Previ, Petrus, Sistel, Fapes, Real Grandeza, Previ Banerj and Valia) are bound by a
shareholders’ agreement that regulates the exercise of voting rights.
The control structure of Perdigao is highly concentrated because the effect of the
shareholders’ agreement, which enables its management to form a quick defense.
However, Perdigao’s ownership structure is sufficiently dispersed to make it a target for a
hostile acquirer.

This situation is very unusual in Brazil and provides evidence of

ownership change.
The Sadia Perdigao case raises two hypotheses for this study: i) corporate control
has become more dispersed among some shareholders; ii) shareholders’s agreements will
be prevalent in firms with dispersed ownership, so that main shareholders can coordinate
control. Analyzing a larger sample of Brazilian companies may show whether a new
trend in ownership patterns has arisen.

74

This information comes from Perdigao’s IAN delivered in 2007 to CVM, which detailed its ownership
structure in 2006.
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V.2. DATA ON SHARE OWNERSHIP

The initial sample consists of the 530 firms listed on Bovespa at the end of
2007.75 The following corporations were excluded: 1) corporations listed on the over the
counter market (ninety-one firms); 2) corporations which have not issued equity (twentyfour firms); 3) corporations that did not pass a “liquidity test,” and did not have any
trading activity between January 1st and May 31st, 2007 (thirty-eight firms); and, 4)
corporations with incomplete or unavailable data (thirty-eight firms).
The final sample consists of 339 corporations, including all the companies listed
on Novo Mercado (ninety-two companies), Level 2 (twenty companies) and Level 1
(forty-four companies) and 183 companies from the standard market.

I collected

information on shareholding structures from IANs delivered to CVM in 2007, referring to
year-end 2006.
IANs must be delivered annually, five months after the end of the company’s
social exercise. They must disclose information regarding the preceding year.76 Any
changes in material facts which occur after the IAN’s delivery must be updated and
resubmitted to CVM, including changes in shareholding ownership.77

Ninety-six

companies reported changes in ownership structures during 2007 and resubmitted
ownership disclosure information to CVM. Accordingly, our data tracks these changes
and includes up-to-date information delivered to CVM by the end of 2007. IANs are
publicly available from CVM’s and Bovespa’s websites.
Additionally, CVM requires that shareholders disclose direct or indirect
shareholding ownership corresponding to 5% or more of shares of a corporation.78 These
data enabled me to identify shareholders composition, directly and indirectly.
Moreover, I have found that the average ownership of the first, third, and fifth largest
shareholders for each segment of Bovespa.79

75

Data from Dec. 19th, 2007.
Instruction CVM No. 202 art. 16 IV “a” and “b”.
77
Instruction CVM No. 202 art. 16 § 7.
78
CVM Instruction 358/2002, art. 12.
79
Some companies have less than five shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares.
76
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I split the sample in two groups: firms with a controlling shareholder and firms
without a controlling shareholder.

Control can be exercised through different

mechanisms. The most obvious, of course, is ownership of a relevant amount of shares.80
For the purposes of this paper, a company is considered to have a controlling shareholder
when a single shareholder (or a block of shareholders bound by shareholders’
agreements) owns more than 50% of the voting shares of the company. A company will
be classified as without a controlling shareholder if the largest shareholder has less than
50% of the voting stock.

Therefore I distinguish between companies with a clear

controlling shareholder and companies without a controlling shareholder.81 A controlling
shareholder by this definition has uncontestable decision-making power in corporate
affairs. He or she may elect the majority of the board of directors (and managers) and
control the agenda of the general shareholders’ meeting. When ownership decreases
below the 50% threshold, the power of one shareholder will depend on the ownership
structure of the other shareholders. This holds true even as ownership of voting shares
declines.
On the other hand, if ownership is considerably diffused (imagine a couple of
shareholders owning around 5% of the voting capital), shareholders could coordinate
control by using a non-ownership mechanism, such as contractual devices. For example,
shareholders’ agreements can guarantee control.

This would occur if shareholders

owning less than 50% of the voting rights engage in a shareholders’ agreement to
regulate their voting rights and/or exercise of control.82

Therefore, shareholders’

80

Control can also be exercised by non-ownership mechanisms such as contracts and actual control of the
proxy machinery.
81
I am aware that this cutoff is very stringent. The literature has applied more lax definitions of controlling
shareholder. See generally, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2; and Claessens, et al.,
supra note 4 (considering a controlling shareholder has 10 to 20 % of either direct or indirect voting rights).
Accordingly, interpretations of the results depend on the threshold of control used to define a controlling
shareholder. If we suppose that 20% of voting stocks is sufficient to characterize control, then the vast
majority of Brazilian firms would be classified as companies with concentration of ownership. Very few
companies with dispersed control. This paper, however, does not take an issue with such interpretation.
My objective is to show that ownership patterns are changing in Brazil, and for this purpose I compare the
results of this analysis with results obtained by previous studies of Brazilian corporate ownership.
Therefore, I find a decrease in ownership concentration, even if one argues that the actual ownership
structures may not be fully classified as dispersed structures.
82 This is not to say, of course, that shareholders holding more than 50% of voting rights cannot engage in
such agreements.
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agreements are powerful mechanisms to assure control without requiring the burdensome
financial commitment of having a lot of non-diversified capital invested in a corporation.
In order to evaluate the role of shareholders’ agreements in bringing about
control structures, I present the data before considering the terms of shareholders’
agreements.
The data on direct ownership confirm that dispersion is found mostly in Novo
Mercado, where the one-share-one-vote requirement promotes a broader diffusion of
voting rights. As reported in Table 8, the majority of firms (sixty-five out of ninety-two)
listed on Novo Mercado lack a controlling shareholder. In those sixty-five firms, the
largest shareholder owns, on average, 26.23% of the shares, the three largest shareholders
own 47.28% of the shares and the five largest own 54.73% of the shares. These results
show two or three largest shareholders can coordinate their voting rights and control a
corporation, even when the largest shareholder alone cannot. If those two or the three
largest shareholders belong to the same family, this formal agreement may not even be
necessary.

In the twenty-seven firms with a controlling shareholder, the largest

shareholder on average owns 60.87% of the shares of the company.
One could still argue that these numbers denote that concentrated ownership is
still prevalent, especially if we accept a 20% threshold to assess control.83 However,
these numbers are greatly contrast with the usual Brazilian pattern of ownership
concentration reported in the previous section. Considering the entire sample of firms
listed on Novo Mercado (ninety-two), the largest shareholder owns 36.39% of the shares.
These data confirm that Novo Mercado achieves considerably dispersed ownership in
comparison to ownership concentration found in earlier studies.84
Level 2 continues to be characterized by the traditional degree of ownership
concentration.

In the sample of twenty companies listed on Level 2, the largest

83

See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at 471, 491 (using a smaller percentage of share
ownership to characterize control).
84
See supra notes __. Previous studies found much larger means. See, e.g., Valadares and Leal, supra
note 50 (finding that the largest shareholder controlled on average 58% of the voting rights); Carvalhal-daSilva and Leal (calculating the average as 72%); and Aldrighi and Oliveira (noting an average of 70.7%.).
Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal found a median of 71%. Therefore, the reported drop on ownership structure
concentration shows a significant change in Brazilian ownership patterns.
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shareholders holds, on average, 64.79% of the voting capital.85

Nonetheless, six

companies have significantly more dispersed ownership. The average voting shares of
the largest shareholder for these firms is approximately 38.84%.
Level 1 also has strong ownership concentration of voting shares. On average,
the forty-four firms of Level 1 have, on average, approximately 63.14% of voting shares
owned by the largest shareholder (see Table 10). Almost 71% of the Level 1 firms have
controlling shareholders who, on average, control 76.07% of the voting rights. Only
thirteen firms, or 29.5% of Level 1 companies, achieve more dispersion of ownership,
with the largest shareholder owning approximately 32.31% of voting rights, on average.
As expected, the same pattern of ownership concentration also applies to the
standard market of Bovespa.

Table 11 shows that approximately 72.67% of the

companies listed on this market have controlling shareholders. Of the entire sample of
183 companies, the largest shareholder holds, on average, 65.50% of the voting shares,
the three largest and the five largest shareholders approximately retain, respectively,
81.64% and 85.19% of the voting shares.
These results confirm our hypotheses. Concentration of ownership increases
moving from Novo Mercado to all the other segments which do not have the one-shareone-vote rule and have less stringent corporate governance requirements.
It is important to keep in mind that, until this point, the ownership data have not
been adjusted to reflect the terms of existing shareholders’ agreements on voting rights
and exercise of control. Incorporating these agreements into the analysis, the ownership
structure will likely become more concentrated because minority shareholders will likely
to be part of a controlling block.

V.3. DIVERGENCE FROM VOTING CAPITAL AND TOTAL CAPITAL

Brazilian law permits corporations to issue non-voting shares.

Companies

publicly held before Law 10.303/2001 may issue up to two-thirds non-voting shares of
85

See infra Table 9.
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the total number of shares. Companies publicly held after that law passed may issue up
to 50% non-voting shares of the total shares.86 Therefore, I also analyze the composition
of voting and non-voting shares to evaluate the divergence between cash flow and voting
rights. Voting shares can assure cash flow rights and control rights, but non-voting
shares can only assure cash flow rights.
Total capital for a specific company is available from CVM’s website. It considers
all the cash flows rights that voting shares plus non-voting shares provide. Therefore,
depending on how many non-voting shares there are, the cash flows rights provided by
voting shares can be smaller or larger.
The divergence between voting capital and total capital determines the level of
private benefits of control that can be extracted from the corporation. The more
concentrated cash-flow rights rest in the hands of the largest shareholder, the stronger the
incentives that she will have to run the firm properly, as doing so will also raise her
wealth. On the contrary, the less cash-flow rights a controlling shareholder has, the better
able she is to extract value to the detriment of minority shareholders and the more firm
valuation will decrease. The larger the divergence between control and cash-flow rights,
the less restrained the controlling shareholder will be to extract value as she will not bear
the costs of her actions accordingly.
Table 8 shows no voting or total capital divergence due to Novo Mercado’s oneshare-one-vote requirement. Table 9 displays total capital data for companies listed on
Level 2. On average, the largest shareholder of a Level 2 firm holds only 42.11% of the
firm’s total capital, even if he or she controls 64.79% of the firm’s voting rights. This
results from the issuance of non-voting shares, which expand the firm’s total capital, but
do not add corresponding voting power. The largest shareholder holds, on average,
approximately 18.72% of the non-voting shares of the corporation.
This divergence is more pronounced in Level 1 firms. According to Table 10, the
largest shareholder of a Level 1 firm, on average, has invested 33.4% of the firm’s total
capital and controlled 63.14% of the voting rights. This largest shareholder retains, on
average, only 7.12% of the corporation’s non-voting shares.
86

See articles __ of Law 6404/76 and __ of Law 10.303/01.
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Table 11 presents data for companies listed on the standard market. The largest
shareholder, on average, owns 49.23% of the corporation’s total capital and 65.5% of the
voting rights. He or she has invested a larger part of the total capital of the company,
retaining approximately 22.65% of its non-voting shares.
Analysis of this information reveals a significant separation of ownership and
control in Brazilian firms. However, controlling shareholders have not yet achieved the
maximum amount of separation possible. Brazilian Corporate Law 6404/76 allowed the
issuance of one-third voting shares and two-thirds non-voting shares. Under the fullest
extent of this law, the controlling shareholder would only need to hold 16.6% of the total
capital. The controlling shareholder would merely need to retain 50% plus one share of
the voting shares because these shares encompassed one-third of the total capital of the
company.
The segment which achieves the largest separation of ownership and control is
Level 1. Level 1 majority shareholders have on average 33.4% of the total capital. But
they still hold two times the number of shares necessary for the exercise control
(16.6%).87 The ability of firms to separate ownership from control is considered to be a
mechanism that explains why ownership is not dispersed in certain environments.88 In
section VII, I develop this theoretical argument to explain why Level 1 firms still
concentrate control through the ownership of voting rights.

V.4. DATA ON SHARE OWNERSHIP ACCOUNTING FOR SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS

Section VI provides a detailed account on the types of shareholders’ agreements
mostly used and their effects. In this section, I consider the impact of shareholders’
agreements on voting rights and control.

87 The

88

old rule still applies for the companies that already adopted the one-third structure during the reform.
Högfeldt, supra note 3, at __.
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Tables 12, 13 and 14 reveal that shareholders’ agreements have a profound effect
in the concentration of voting rights and control in Brazil. Table 12 shows that the sixtyfive Novo Mercado companies without a controlling shareholder drop to forty-five firms
when considering the effects of shareholders’ agreements over control.

Twenty

companies (30.76%) with diffuse ownership become companies with a clear controlling
group (owning more than 50% of the voting rights) when shareholders’ agreements are
taken into account. Before accounting for the agreements, the largest shareholder from
these twenty companies held an average of 28.06% of the voting rights.

When

shareholders’ agreements are considered, the share ownership average of the group of
shareholders exercising control through such agreements increases to 65.27% for these
twenty companies. Overall, the shareholders’ agreements make the average largest stake
of ownership in the total sample increase from 36.39% to 45.25%. Nevertheless, the
main conclusion regarding the larger dispersion of ownership structures in Novo Mercado
persists. In contrast to previous studies, the 45.25% average ownership of the agreementbound group of shareholders indicates a meaningful decrease of ownership concentration
in Brazilian firms.
Table 13 exhibits ownership patterns in Level 2 companies. Four of the six Level
2 companies characterized as lacking controlling shareholders have been reincorporated
into the analysis as companies with a controlling shareholder due to their shareholders’
agreements. Shareholders’ agreements cause the overall average of ownership of the
largest block of shareholders to rise from 64.79% to 69.6%.

Thus, the impact of

shareholders’ agreements on ownership of the controlling block is not as accentuated as
in Novo Mercado.
Table 14 considers the impact of shareholders’ agreements in the structure of
firms in Level 1. Nine of the thirteen firms (69.23%) previously considered to lack a
controlling shareholder become companies with a controlling shareholder group. In these
firms, agreements cause the average of the voting rights retained by the largest
shareholder group to increase from 27% to approximately 70%. Overall, the average
ownership of voting rights for the largest shareholder changes from approximately
63.14% to 72.75%, revealing an even higher concentration of control in this segment.
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This analysis shows that shareholders’ agreements are important mechanisms to
coordinate control in Brazilian corporations. These agreements tend to be adopted in
companies where ownership is largely dispersed.

Approximately 40% of these

companies (thirty-three of the eighty-four companies) have a determined group of
shareholders that jointly exercise control by means of shareholders’ agreements.
Considering shareholders’ agreements, the number of companies without controlling
shareholders drops considerably in all three special segments: from sixty-five to fortyfive in Novo Mercado, from six to two in Level 2, and from thirteen to three in Level 1.
Novo Mercado is the only listing segment that maintains degree of ownership dispersion,
with an adjusted average ownership under 50%, even though the number of companies
with controlling shareholders (forty-seven) surpasses the number of companies without
controlling shareholders (forty-five) when these agreements are considered.
This analysis shows that shareholders’ agreements have a profound impact in
Brazilian corporate ownership and control. They work as substitute mechanisms to share
ownership when shareholders have less ownership and control is more dispersed. They
provide control concentration and coordination by regulating shared control among few
shareholders.
This analysis also points out that current corporate governance literature does not
consider the impact of these agreements on international patterns of corporate ownership.
Nonetheless, as the Brazilian experience shows, shareholders’ agreements may be key
instruments to organize the interests of important blockholders, making control much
more concentrated in practice than share ownership could reveal.

V.5. DATA ON INDIRECT ULTIMATE LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS

Different types of ultimate shareholders shape different market characteristics
and, therefore, different types of capitalism. Well-developed equity markets, such as
those in the US and Britain, present distinctive features. Most listed companies in these
systems have diffused ownership.

Large shareholdings, and especially majority

ownership, are rare. In addition, very few large companies are family-controlled. In both
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the United States and Britain, institutional investors, like pension and mutual funds and
insurance companies, retain significant ownership of listed companies, even if they own
minority stakes in large public companies.89 These particular types of ownership afford
different types of governance practices.90
This section analyses the use and effect of pyramiding on corporate control
structures. Pyramiding implies a discrepancy between the ultimate owner’s total capital
and control rights. The total capital is given by the product of ownership stakes along the
chain. If a shareholder owns 40% of Firm A and Firm A owns 20% of Firm B, then this
shareholder owns 8% of Firm B’s cash flow rights. Control rights are measured by the
weakest link in the control chain. In the former example, the shareholder would control
Firm B with 20% of the voting rights.
I now analyze shareholder composition backwards to identify the ultimate main
shareholders of Brazilian corporations.91 I classify the ultimate largest shareholder in one
of the following categories: 1) individuals or families, 2) foreign investors (individuals or
institutions), 3) government, 4) institutional investors (banks, insurance firms, pension
funds, foundations or investment funds). For companies that do not have a controlling
shareholder, I identify the largest ultimate shareholder – the shareholder who owns the
largest number of voting shares of the corporation.
In practice, one has to make several assumptions in order to calculate indirect
ownership structures. Some of these assumptions include: a) how one defines each
defining category (for example, how one defines ‘institutional investors’), and b) how
one groups different families that are the main shareholders of one company.
Regarding the first assumption, banks are typically considered to be institutional
investors.92 However, in many countries, banks can be controlled by families. Therefore
89
See Brian Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto,
10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 5, 12 (1999-2000) (quoting studies finding that institutional investors retain
ownership of approximately 50% of the equity market in the United States and between 16% and 70% of
the equity market in England).
90 Scholars either propose active or passive participation for institutional investors in corporate governance.
See [quote studies]. See also Cheffins, id. at 25 (discussing proposals from the Cadbury Committee and the
Hampel Committee to improve institutional investor participation in corporate governance).
91
This analysis does not consider the existence of shareholders’ agreements in order to identify the largest
ultimate shareholder from the exclusive perspective of ownership patterns.
92
See e.g., Leal, supra note __.
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classifying banks as institutional investors may distort the measures of corporate
ownership if one does not assess the bank’s main shareholders. The same applies to
investment funds. Only when participation in an investment fund is not disclosed in
CVM dataset, I treat those funds as institutional investors.

Therefore, the data for

individual or family ownership may be underestimated.
Regarding the second assumption, Diagram 1 shows the ownership structure of
Klabin S.A. We can distinguish three families as the main shareholders of Klabin S.A.:
the Lafers, the Pivas and the Klabins. The results of indirect ownership structure will
vary according to whether we group these families among themselves as one big family,
two joint families or three separated families. There is some evidence that these families
might constitute one single family. For example, the name of one holding company is
Jacob Klabin Lafer Adm e Part. SA, which might lead us to conclude that Klabin and
Lafer have a family relationship. The main shareholders of this company nonetheless are
Miguel Lafer and Vera Lafer. Another example would be Sylvia Lafer Piva, Horacio
Lafer Piva and Eduardo Lafer Piva, who carry two names of the main families.
Therefore, results will change depending on how we aggregate these families. One can
consider the Klabins comprising one family separate from the Lafers and the Pivas. In
this situation the Klabins controls 57.22%, while the Lafers owns 45.36% of the voting
capital structure, and the Pivas own 20.32% of the voting rights. In a second situation, if
one considers Lafer and Piva as one family group, separated from the Klabins, the result
will be that the Lafers and Pivas will be the controlling shareholders with 57.88% of the
voting rights. For table 19, I treated the three families as being part of the same family.
The Klabins, the Lafers and Pivas jointly control 59.5% of the voting capital of Klabin
SA and 20.55% of the total capital.
Other cases, such as Medial Saude SA, are simpler. Medial Saude SA has three
main families (Kalil, Rocha Mello, and Schapira) who control 75% of the company´s
voting capital. There is no apparent evidence that those families are related. Therefore,
for the purposes of this study, I considered these families as three separated main
shareholders. However, if they happen to be part of the same family in practice, I have
underestimated the concentration of family control. Therefore, my analysis assumes that
different last names designate different shareholders. In contrast, shareholders with the
34

same last names are considered to belong to the same family group. As Faccio and Lang
pointed out, this convention may understate family affiliation and, therefore,
concentration of control.93
I find that individual and family ownership are clearly dominant in Brazilian
corporations.

Of the twenty-seven firms listed on Novo Mercado with controlling

shareholders, twenty of them (74.07%) are controlled by individuals or families (Table
15). The large majority (17 out of 20) of companies controlled by either individuals or
families are controlled by means of a pyramidal structure. In Novo Mercado’s firms
without a controlling shareholder, individual or family ownership also accounts for the
largest stake of shares in corporations. Of sixty-five companies without a controlling
shareholder, thirty-seven companies have individuals or families as the ultimate largest
shareholders. Overall, as Table 15 shows, individual or family ownership is found in
fifty-seven firms, which amounts to 39.75% of Novo Mercado’s total market
capitalization (Table 16). Foreign companies are the second largest shareholders. They
are the largest ultimate shareholder in twenty-four companies, 21.86% of the entire
sample of Novo Mercado’s firms. Institutional shareholders are the largest ultimate
shareholders of six companies and account for 15.08% of Novo Mercado’s market
capitalization, (Table 16). Only five companies are government-owned, but government
ownership amounts to 23.31 % of the market capitalization of the segment (Table 16).
Table 17 displays ownership data for companies listed on Level 2. Considering
companies with a controlling shareholder, individual or family ownership (8) still
predominates in relation to foreign ownership (4). Considering companies without a
controlling shareholder, individuals or family ownership is found in five out of six
companies. Individual or family ownership is responsible for 63.62% of the market
capitalization, followed by foreign companies and the government with 21.12% and
15.26% respectively (Table 18).
Information on the ultimate shareholder in Level 1 is found in Table 19.
Individual and family ownership is also pervasive.

Twenty-one out of thirty-one

companies that have controlling shareholders are individual or family-held. Individuals
93

Faccio & Lang, supra note 3, at 388 (2002).
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and families are also the largest ultimate shareholder of nine out of thirteen companies
without a controlling shareholder. Table 19 also shows that individuals and families
greatly rely on pyramidal structures to exercise control. Control is kept through indirect
control structures in twenty-seven of twenty-nine companies that have individuals and
families as either the controlling or the largest ultimate shareholders. Table 20 shows
that individual or family ownership responds for the second largest market capitalization
(40.57%).

Institutional shareholders are responsible for the first largest market

capitalization (48.16%), even though they either control or are the largest ultimate
shareholders of only six companies.
Table 21 reports ownership data for companies listed on the standard market.
Individual/family ownership is also dominant, followed by foreign ownership. Of the
133 companies with controlling shareholders, seventy-eight are controlled by
individuals/families, seventy-one of them by means of indirect mechanisms (pyramids).
They are also the largest ultimate shareholders of thirty-seven corporations (out of fifty
companies without a controlling shareholder). But in terms of market capitalization,
individual/family ownership accounts for only 9.87% (Table 22). This shows that most
companies tend to be small, and hardly match the concept of a true publicly-held
company. The government is the first largest ultimate shareholder in terms of the
standard level’s market capitalization, with 48.63% (eighteen companies).

Foreign

ownership represents the second largest market capitalization. Foreign shareholders are
the largest ultimate shareholders in thirty-seven companies and achieve 39.18% of the
standard market capitalization.
Table 23 provides an overview on the general use of non-voting shares and
pyramidal structures by the different types of last ultimate owners. Considering the
whole sample of companies with available information (339), 163 companies make use
of both pyramidal structures and non-voting shares.

Sixty-seven companies adopt

pyramidal structures and sixty-two companies adopt non-voting shares.

Therefore

approximately 86% of the firms in the sample separate of ownership and control through
these mechanisms. Considering all the companies of the sample, approximately 69% of
them present non-voting shares, and 66% present pyramidal structures. Individuals and
families are by far the groups that adopt these mechanisms for separation of ownership
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and control. Considering the whole sample, 51.03% of the firms have individuals and
families as last ultimate shareholders that make use of pyramidal structures and 43.66%
that also adopt non-voting shares.
Several studies have found that large shareholdings are usually associated with
families.94 I find that family ownership increases in the segments that are characterized
by more concentrated ownership. Family firms’ heavy reliance on pyramidal structures
shows that they are used to organizing interests of the several family members. .

VI. CONSEQUENCES OF GREATER DISPERSION OF OWNERSHIP ON CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR: SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS, INDEPENDENCE OF DIRECTORS, AND POISON
PILLS

This section develops the main consequences generated by the increase of ownership
dispersion in Brazilian capital markets. I detect two main developments: widespread use
of shareholders’ agreements as mechanisms to coordinate joint control and adoption of
anti-takeover devices to avoid hostile takeovers.

VI.1. TYPES OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS

As ownership has become more dispersed in the market, shareholders’
agreements have increasingly been used to coordinate control. The Brazilian Corporate
Law provides that shareholders’ agreements can regulate the purchase and sale of shares,
preference to acquire shares, the exercise of voting rights, or the exercise of control.95
Shareholders’ agreements may be mixed to address more than one of these subjects. The
Corporate Law also contains specific rules regarding disclosure of these agreements.

94
La Porta et. al, supra note 2, at __. Claessens, et al., supra note 6, at 2764 (finding that 70% of the
blockholders of their sample is comprised by families).
95
Article 118 of Law 6404/7. (“Article 118. Shareholder agreements regulating the purchase and sale of
shares, preference to acquire shares, the exercise of voting rights, or the exercise of control must be
observed by the corporation when filed in its head office.”).
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While shareholders’ agreements are generally kept private in many jurisdictions,96 in
Brazil these agreements must be duly entered in the corporation’s registration books to be
enforceable against third parties.97 They bind the corporation itself provided that they are
filed with the corporation’s head office.98 Therefore, shareholders have strong incentives
to disclose these agreements.99 If shareholders do not register the agreements with the
company, agreements will be enforceable only between the signing parties.100
The 2001 Corporate Law reform expanded shareholders’ agreements’ ability to
control corporate actions. Directors elected by shareholders who have signed such an
agreement are required to vote in accordance with the terms of the agreement.101 Votes
cast in breach of the agreement will not be considered by the president of the meeting.102
Therefore, shareholders’ agreements now play an even more critical role in corporate
governance.

They cannot only regulate the control exercise and voting rights of

shareholders, but also bind directors’ votes to the terms of the agreement and therefore
diminish directors’ independence.
The disclosure of shareholders’ agreements to the public presents an interesting
research opportunity. Black, Carvalho and Gorga survey corporate governance practices
in Brazil, based on an extensive 2005 survey. They find that thirty-six (42%) of the
Brazilian private companies in their sample have a shareholders’ agreements among the

96

REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 75(Oxford University Press __).
Article 118, paragraph 1, of Law 6404/76 (“Paragraph 1. The commitments or encumbrances resulting
from such an agreement may only be enforced against a third party after the agreement has been duly
entered in the register books and on the share certificates, if any.”).
98
See Article 118 of Law 6404/76, supra note 95.
99
See Black, Carvalho & Gorga supra note 26, (finding that 92% of all shareholders’ agreements are
registered with the company in Brazil and showing that the parties want to enjoy stronger enforcement
against third parties and the corporation itself).
100
See Article 118, paragraph 1, of Law 6404/76, supra note 96
101
Article 118, paragraph 9, of Law 6404/76. (“Paragraph 9. Failure to attend a general meeting or
meetings of the corporation’s management bodies, as well as failure to vote on matters specified in the
shareholders’ agreement by any party or by members of the board of directors elected under the terms of
the shareholders’ agreement assures the damaged party the right to vote with the shares belonging to the
shareholder who is absent or remiss and, in case of a member of the board of directors, by the board
member elected by the votes of the damaged party.”)
102
Article 118, paragraph 8, of Law 6404/76. (“Paragraph 8. The president of the meeting or of the
decision making body of the corporation shall not compute a vote that infringes a duly filed shareholders’
agreement.”)
97
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members of the controlling family or group.103 In twenty-four (67%) of these firms, the
shareholder agreement ensures joint control.104 The authors also report that in twenty-two
firms, one or more non-independent directors were elected in accordance with a
shareholders’ agreement. In twelve firms, four or more directors are elected under a
shareholders’ agreement, forming a majority of the board.105

Thus, shareholders’

agreements perform an important role in Brazilian corporate governance.
I collected and analyzed all shareholders’ agreements provided by companies
without a controlling shareholder to Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios. These agreements
are available along with other material information on publicly-held companies disclosed
at CVM’s website.
Shareholders’ agreements are deemed to be material information.106 Therefore,
engaging, amending or breaching these agreements immediately trigger disclosure
obligations to the market. I collected shareholders’ agreements dating from September to
December 2007. I focus on agreements of companies without a controlling shareholder
because their shareholders’ agreements are likely to produce more relevant effects on
corporate control. My objective is to understand whether shareholders’ agreements are
being used as substitute mechanisms in order to assure control when ownership has
become more dispersed.

Companies with controlling shareholders might have

shareholders’ agreements which I do not investigate in this paper. Intuitively, these
agreements are less likely to regulate control itself, and may regulate the (preference for)
purchase or sale of shares, or the relation between controlling shareholders and strategic
minority shareholders.
The sample consists of eighty-four Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1
companies without a controlling shareholder. Initially, I find that fifty-four of these
companies have shareholders’ agreements available for download on the CVM website. I

103

Black, Carvalho & Gorga, supra note 26, at 39 (reporting that thirty-six of eighty-six companies
surveyed have shareholders’ agreements).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Instruction CVM No. 358/2002, art. 2, Unique Paragraph, I, II and III (considering shareholders’
agreements material information (“fato relevante”) when they cause changes in the control of the company,
when they are entered in the register books of the corporation, or when the corporation is an intervening
party in the agreement).
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then access the percentage of shares each agreement binds to establish whether the
agreements affect the control of the companies.

A company without a controlling

shareholder may have a de facto controlling shareholder group due to the shareholders’
agreement. Nonetheless I find many inconsistencies when attempting to establish the
percentage of shares that are bound by the shareholders’ agreements.

These

inconsistencies mostly emerge when comparing agreements’ parties with the company’s
reported shareholding ownership structure available on CVM. For example, consider the
case of COSAN SA Indústria e Comércio. At the time of the research, there were two
shareholders’ agreements available for download for this company at CVM’s website.
Apparently both were valid shareholders’ agreements. However, the company latest IAN
(also available on CVM) refers only to the existence of one agreement. Furthermore, the
shareholders that signed one agreement do not correspond to the shareholders who are
reported in the company’s shareholding structure available in the IAN. In order to
resolve this contradiction, I contacted the company. After conversations with the investor
relations officer, I was informed that the shareholders’ agreement under analysis is no
longer effective. Similarly, phone calls were made to all companies with inconsistent
data in order to clarify questions on validity, contracting parties and the percentage of
shares included in shareholders’ agreements.
This process revealed that forty-two, or 50%, of the companies have valid
shareholders’ agreements. The distribution of companies that have these agreements
among the listing segments are as follows: twenty-eight (66.67%) Novo Mercado
companies, four (9.52%) Level 2 companies, and ten (23.81%) Level 1 companies. The
majority of companies without controlling shareholders that have shareholders’
agreements come from Novo Mercado, which has the largest number of companies with
more dispersed control.

Shareholders’ agreements, especially voting and control

agreements, are most likely to be adopted by companies that have more dispersion of
ownership.
I then inquire about the scope of these shareholders’ agreements. Table 24 shows
the types of agreements that shareholders engage in.

Sixteen of the forty-two

shareholders’ agreements (38.1%) are mixed to regulate preferences to acquire shares and
voting rights. Twelve shareholders’ agreements (28.57%) regulate the sale and purchase
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of shares, the preference to acquire shares, voting rights and control exercise. Three
shareholders’ agreements (7.14%) include clauses on preferences to acquire shares and
voting rights.
I classify shareholders’ agreements as control agreements when they regulate
control exercised by shareholders that jointly own more that 50% of the corporation’s
voting rights.

I stringently define control according to the definition of controlling

shareholder adopted in this paper. The most predominant clause found in thirty-nine out
of forty-two shareholders’ agreements (92.86%) refers to the exercise of shareholders’
voting power. Of these, seven shareholders’ agreements bind shareholders that have less
than 50% of the voting rights.107 One could argue that voting rights agreements could
also regulate control when a group of minority shareholders coordinate their votes, even
if they do not jointly own 50% of the voting shares. One example is the Inpar S.A.
agreement, which binds 41.42% of the voting shares of the corporation. While this
agreement could be considered as a control agreement, I prefer to classify it as a voting
agreement to maintain a consistent definition of control in this paper. Any agreement that
relies on a ownership based on less than 50% of the voting rights require a case-by-case
analysis to verify whether shareholders exercised control. This could lead to arbitrary
decisions. My analysis, therefore, may underestimate the number of minority control
agreements that can exist in practice.
Another caveat regarding agreements’ classification is important.

I have

formally (literally) and qualitatively analyzed the contents of these agreements. At first, I
consider control agreements the agreements expressly regulating control issues. Only
nine (28.13%) agreements are literal control agreements.

The other twenty-three

agreements (71.87%) are classified as control agreements because they bind more than
50% of the voting shares of a corporation. These numbers show that most control
agreements are not literal agreements. Therefore my classification may not match the
literal classification contained in the agreements themselves, but I believe that content
analysis provides a clearer idea of the effects of shareholders’ agreements.
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As Table 24 displays infra, these shareholders’ agreements also regulate issues other than voting rights.
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One example is Abyara SA.’s shareholders’ agreement which binds 52.9% of the
voting shares. The text of the agreement regulates the behavior of stockholders and the
exercise of voting rights and the transfer of the shares bound in the agreement.
Nonetheless, the agreement does not make explicit that one of its objectives is to regulate
control. Instead, one of its expressed objectives is “to provide general orientation for the
business management of the company.”108 The agreement states that shareholders hold a
preliminary meeting to decide voting orientation prior to any general meeting of the
company. Thus, upon analysis of its content, it is clear that the agreement regulates not
only voting rights, but also the joint exercise of control. Therefore, even if shareholders
do not consider this a control agreement, I classify it as a control agreement.
The same rationale applies to the case of Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Bio. Ol.
Veg. S.A., which has a shareholders’ agreement binding 65.3% of the voting shares. The
agreement does not mention explicitly that it regulates corporate control. Yet it states
that parties to the agreement aim “to regulate their reciprocal relations, notably with
respect to stocks transfers, exercise of voting rights and management of the company.”109
Thus, the agreement is clearly a control agreement. Agreements categorized as control
agreements are also classified as voting rights agreement because control cannot be
exercised without the coordination of voting rights. So every control agreement will
inevitably encompass a voting rights agreement.
Table 24 reflects this more comprehensive qualitative classification of control. I
find that thirty-two out of forty-two shareholders’ agreements include regulation, among
other issues, of control. Therefore, control agreements are adopted by 76.19% of the
companies that have shareholders’ agreements. Focusing on Novo Mercado, which is
segment with the largest number of shareholders’ agreements, I find that twenty-six out
of twenty-eight shareholders’ agreements are either control agreements (19) or voting
agreements (7). This result confirms my hypothesis: the majority of companies without a
controlling shareholder adopt shareholders’ agreements to coordinate control or voting
rights as a substitute for share ownership.
108

Abyara Planejamento Imobiliario S.A. Shareholders’ Agreement Consolidation from Apr. 16, 2007, at
3, item 6.
109 Brasil Ecodiesel Industria e Comercio de Biocombustiveis e Oleos Vegetais S.A. Shareholders’
Agreement from Aug. 14, 2006, at 1.
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VI.2. SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS EFFECT ON DIRECTORS’ VOTES

I now analyze to what extent shareholders’ agreements bind director’s votes.
From the forty-two companies that have shareholders’ agreements, twenty-six (61.90%)
of them have shareholders’ agreements that bind directors’ votes. Of these twenty-six
companies, sixteen (61.53%) of them specify instances in which directors’ votes are
bound and ten do not.
Table 25 displays the detailed content of the clauses of sixteen agreements that
bind directors’ votes. It shows that shareholders’ agreements of fourteen companies
(87.50%) regulate votes on transactions resulting in sale and/or actions affecting
company assets.

Eleven companies’ (68.75%) agreements bind directors votes on

distributions of earnings and dividends. Ten companies (62.50%) have agreements that
control directors’ votes on contracts within the value range stipulated in the agreement,
and budget approval. Nine companies (56.25%) have agreements that dominate votes on
the issuance of securities. Eight companies’ agreements (50%) regulate the election or
dismissal of managers. Six companies (37.5%) have agreements that have power over
directors’ votes on merger, acquisition, incorporation, liquidation and corporate
transformation, approval or dismissal of independent auditors and others.

Four

companies (25%) use shareholders’ agreements to restrict compensation policies and
benefits for managers and board members, reduction or increase in the social capital, and
creation of joint ventures, among other things.
This analysis presents a paradox. While some companies have been complying
with better standards of corporate governance, they have shareholders’ agreements that
constrain directors’ votes in practice. Therefore, directors lose their independence. As
discussed previously, this situation is oddly endorsed by the current Brazilian legislation.
This total lack of director’s independence is at odds with Level 2’s and Novo Mercado’s
rules for good corporate governance. It is also contrary to current international corporate
governance recommendations.
Level 2’s and Novo Mercado’s rules require that the board of directors must have
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at least five members, from which at least 20% shall be independent members.110
Bovespa defines independence in Section II of Novo Mercado’s Regulation. According
to this section an “Independent Director”
is characterized by (i) not having any ties with the Company, except capital
participation; ii) not being a Controlling Shareholder, husband, wife, or second
level relative of the Controlling Shareholder, or not being, in the last 3 years,
connected to a company or an entity related to the Controlling Shareholder
(people connected to public institutions of education and/or research are excluded
from this restriction); (iii) not being, in the last 3 years, employee or officer of the
company; of the Controlling Shareholder or of a firm controlled by the Company
(iv) not being supplier or buyer, direct or indirect, of services and/or products of
the Company, in magnitude which implies a loss of independence; (v) not being
an employee or manager of a company or entity which is offering or demanding
services and/or products to the Company; (vi) not being husband, wife or second
level relative of any manager of the company; (vii) not receiving remuneration of
the Company other than that of a director (compensation originated from capital
participation is excluded from this restriction).111
This definition does not clarify whether or not directors bound by shareholders’
agreements would be considered independent. It remains unclear how Bovespa assesses
the number of independent directors of companies listed on the special segments that
require compliance with the 20% of independent directors’ threshold.

If Bovespa

considers those directors bound by shareholders’ agreements as independent, it is clearly
making a mistake. Directors bound by shareholders’ agreements cannot be deemed
independent.

These agreements directly interfere in decisions that directors make

because they determine ex ante how directors ought to vote before they have analyzed a
situation and reached an independent conclusion.
One may even dispute whether having independent directors is good for corporate
governance, as there is evidence that they do not contribute to improving company
performance.112 However, if Bovespa has decided that having independent directors is an
important rule for good corporate governance, it should enforce its own rules.
Independent directors are considered important in developing countries which
110
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typically have boards dominated by representatives of the controlling shareholders.113 In
those countries, having independent directors may contribute to decreasing levels of
expropriation and, as a consequence, augmenting the company’s wealth.

Evidence

supports that having more independent directors is associated with better corporate
performance in emerging markets. A study by Black, Jang and Kim found that requiring
large firms have a majority of outside directors has caused increased stock price in Korea
by 40%. The market valued the companies’ existing cash flow higher apparently because
a perception that outside directors help eliminate insider self-dealing.114
To conclude, this study obviates the fact that control comes in different forms.
Despite the current focus of the literature, control does not only come through equity
ownership in a direct or indirect way (pyramids). It can also take contractual forms. This
section presents evidence concerning consequences of shareholders’ agreements to
corporate governance. Shareholders’ agreements work as substitute control mechanisms
when ownership is more dispersed.

As the Brazilian experience shows, when

shareholders do not have enough ownership to assure control, they can rely on
shareholders’ agreements to coordinate joint control. This is the case mainly in Novo
Mercado, which concentrates the vast majority of the companies that adopt control or
voting agreements. Furthermore, Brazilian shareholders’ agreements also bind votes of
directors in certain matters, lessening director independence.

Thus, under certain

circumstances, board decisions may not be based on the best interests of the corporation
or minority shareholders.

VI.3. CHANGES IN BYLAWS: ANTI-TAKEOVER CLAUSES

Takeovers have been extremely rare in the Brazilian capital markets due to the
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prices than firms with fewer outside directors. This effect appears to be causal. This is the first strong
evidence that greater board independence predicts higher share prices in emerging markets.”).
114

45

ownership structure of Brazilian corporations discussed in Part III.115

Control

transactions have usually been conducted by means of private agreements, in which a
large control premium is paid to the seller of control.116

In 2001, a reform to

Corporations Law 6404/76 reintroduced a mandatory rule for tag along rights in sales of
control.

This rule, Article 254-A, provides that minority voting shareholders must

receive 80% of the price paid for a controlling shareholder’s voting shares in a sale of
control.
Additionally, Bovespa burdened private sales of corporate control. It introduced
a “super” tag along right in the listing requirements of Novo Mercado and Level 2.
Under this rule, the acquirer of control in a private sale must indemnify all other
shareholders from whom the acquirer purchased shares six months before the control
transaction. The acquirer will be required to pay the same price paid to the shares of the
controlling shareholder. Indemnification should take place on top of the usual tender
offer to acquire all minority shares as required by the corporate law 6404/76. Table 26
shows that, companies from Novo Mercado and Level 2 and a few companies from Level
1 have also voluntarily adopted the super tag along clause.
As ownership structures have been changing, one may think that potential
acquirers may be able to acquire control more easily in the market. However, antitakeover defenses have begun to appear in company’s bylaws as ownership has become
increasingly dispersed.

The media has already pointed out this phenomenon.117

However, there has been no attempt to analyze the extension of their use in a systematic
way.
To fill this gap and examine the evolution of Brazilian capital markets and
corporate governance, this article empirically analyzes how many companies have
adopted defenses and which defenses are most common. The sample includes bylaws of
eighty-four companies listed in Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1, which do not have a
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controlling shareholder. I focus on these companies118 because they are mostly likely to
have anti-takeover defenses due to their larger degree of ownership dispersion.119 The
bylaws have been collected from IANs delivered to CVM at the end of April of 2007,
referring to year-end 2006. Changes in bylaws during the year of 2007 must be disclosed
and updated in CVM´s website.

I collected the bylaws between September and

December of 2007.
Brazil has developed defenses other than the poison pill, which is the most trivial
anti-takeover defense in the United States. A poison pill is a typical shareholder rights
plan in the United States and involves a target issuing rights to its existing shareholders to
acquire a large number of new stocks. Holders can buy more stocks under market value
when anyone acquires a pre-determined amount of target’s stock (typically 10-20%) in a
possible control acquisition. This strategy dilutes the percentage of target’s common
shares that the bidder owns, making it more expensive to acquire control of the company.
In Brazil, the predominant takeover defense is a provision in the company’s charter that
allows current shareholders to sell their shares to an acquirer who attains a critical limit of
target’s shares. In this sense it resembles the mandatory tender offer required by law but
is triggered by a lower threshold of shares’ acquistion. Nonethless, the media calls this
defense a poison pill. Yet this type of takeover defense might not completely stop a
determined acquirer. Instead, it ensures minority shareholders the right to tender their
shares at a fair price if they think this is a good time to sell. This strategy also makes the
target acquisition much more expensive to the bidder.
The use of anti-takeover clauses is widespread. Forty-seven out of eighty-four
companies, or approximately 56% of the sample companies, have included antitakeover
protections in their bylaws.
There appear to be two prevalent types of defenses. A “Type A” anti-takeover
defense provides that once a determined threshold of ownership is met, the acquiring
shareholder must make a tender offer to acquire all outstanding shares. This threshold of
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For this Section, the same definition applies: a controlling shareholder is considered to have more than
50% of the voting stocks.
119 The underlining idea is that the controlling shareholder of a company does not need to be concerned
with including poison pill clauses in the bylaws because control cannot be sold without his or her consent.
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acquisition generally ranges from 10% to 35% of the shares. Brazilian Corporate Law
does not require an acquirer to offer minority shareholders to tender their stock for sale if
the acquirer has purchased the control in the market. The mandatory tag along right
requires a tender offer only for a sale of a controlling block by the controlling
shareholder.120 This clause, on the other hand, requires a tender offer of shares even if
control was acquired in the market, making hostile takeovers as burdensome as a private
sales of control.
A “Type B” anti-takeover defense, in contrast, is triggered when a shareholder
who has acquired a pre-determined threshold of ownership wishes to purchase more
shares. In that situation, that shareholder has to communicate his or her intention to the
Investor Relations Manager of the company and the Manager of Trading Activity of the
stock exchange. This threshold of acquisition generally ranges from 5% to 30% of the
shares. The Manager of Trading Activity can then arrange a tender offer conducted by an
open auction in the exchange market.

This provision aims to promote competition

between bidders interested in acquiring the company’s control.
Table 26 categorizes the types of anti takeover clauses adopted by each company
listed in Bovespa’s special segments.

It shows that 36.9% of the companies adopt

exclusively Type A clauses. Approximately 14.28% of the companies adopt Type A and
Type B clauses. Only four firms (4.76%) exclusively use Type B clauses. Table 26 also
provides the thresholds of Type A and B clauses that will trigger the acquirer’s
obligation. Approximately 53.5% of Type A companies adopt a 20% threshold. For
Type B companies, 43.75% adopt a 10% threshold.
The widespread adoption of anti-takeover defenses implies that lawyers acted
faster than Brazilian regulators. Brazilian law does not regulate the use of these clauses.
The preceding analysis has covered only bylaws of firms without a controlling
shareholder. However, available information shows that companies controlled by a
controlling shareholder who holds more than 51% of the voting capital have also adopted
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defenses.121 This demonstrates that lawyers have been eager to avoid future changes in
control, even if a hostile takeover were factually impossible at that time. It is worth
noting that it is unclear why a company with a controlling shareholder would include
anti-takeover defenses clauses in its bylaws. In that situation, the clause would constrain
the sale of the controlling shareholder who may later want to sell its control block, which
would be contrary to a wealth maximizing behavior from a rational economic agent.
This situation appears to show that controlling shareholders do not understand the effect
of the clauses and that lawyers did not clarifying the full implications of anti-takeover
clauses to their clients. Arguably, the controlling shareholder can call a meeting and
amend the bylaws to exclude the clause. In this case, the defense would generate
additional transaction costs before the sale of control.
Nonetheless, Brazilian players seem to be celebrating the adoption of antitakeover defenses. Dispersed ownership is usually associated with more mature capital
markets. Players may want companies’ bylaws to provide anti-takeover mechanisms
because takeovers would again concentrate control. According to this rationale, antitakeover defenses are considered to be useful devices to promote and stabilize diffused
ownership. They are devices companies use to signal that their ownership structure will
continue to be dispersed.
In other environments, anti-takeover defenses are generally considered wealth
decreasing mechanisms that safeguard control from outside monitoring.
typically designed by managers.

They are

Because managers seek to entrench themselves,

defenses are usually thought to increase agency costs between the management and
shareholders.
Takeovers are widely believed to be wealth maximizing because they replace
inefficient management with a more efficient one, promoting allocation of resources to a
higher use value. The threat of a hostile takeover is considered to discipline incumbent
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Participacoes, which adopted poison pill Types A and B, and SulAmerica S.A., which adopted defense
Type B.
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management.122 If managers do not run the company properly, the company will lose its
value and become a potential target for a hostile takeover.
In Brazil, if the current situation persists, poor managers may not face this type of
market discipline. Many bylaws go even further than providing mandatory tender offer
clauses. They establish penalty clauses that are triggered if the tender offers clauses are
breached. The adoption of penalty clauses is pervasive. Of the forty-seven companies
that adopt anti-takeover defenses, 100% adopt at least one penalty clause. There are two
types of penalty clauses .
Penalty clause “Type 1” provides that if the acquirer does not comply with the
tender offer clause, the board of directors will call an extraordinary shareholder meeting.
The board will deliberate about the suspension of shareholder rights of the acquirer’s of
control. The suspension of rights will apply to the shares that were acquired in disregard
of the tender offer clause. The shareholder that has acquired the control will not be able
to cast votes in this meeting. He or she may also be subjected to liability for damages
suffered by the other shareholders in connection with the breach of the tender offer. This
penalty clause is therefore applied against the acquirer of blockholdings.
Penalty clause “Type 2” provides that any future change in the bylaws that
restrict shareholders’ rights to tender their shares according to the tender offer clause will
obligate shareholders who approved the change to make a tender offer to acquire the
shares of the other shareholders. Basically, they prevent anti-takeover clauses from being
excluded from bylaws, even if the majority of shareholders want to deliberate their
exclusion in a shareholder meeting. This happens because the huge costs imposed on
shareholders that approve this exclusion. Interestingly, as some commentators have said,
under Type 2 penalty clauses, Brazilian anti-takeover clauses seems to acquire status of
fundamental rights that cannot be contracted around. These penalty clauses are applied
against to shareholders who want to ban the tender offer clause, regardless of whether
they want to take this action to protect the welfare of the corporation.
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The data displayed in Table 26 show that of the forty-seven companies that adopt
penalty clauses, twenty-five (53.19%) companies exclusively use penalty clause Type 1.
Twenty-two (46.81%) companies adopt both clauses types 1 and 2. Clause Type 2 is not
solely adopted. Only eight companies (10.81%) have bylaws that explicitly state that the
tender offer clause can be removed.123 Of these eight, only three companies establish a
qualified quorum for the approval of changes concerning the clause.124 Six of the eight
companies confer authority power to the shareholder meeting to remove the tender offer
clause. The remaining two companies confer this authority to the board of directors.
This analysis shows that changes in ownership patterns towards more dispersed
ownership have produced important effects in companies’ bylaws.

It has prompted

shareholders to adopt takeover defenses. These defenses may not correspond to a factual
threat of takeover attacks, as there still is a significant degree of concentrated ownership
in most companies that could preclude takeovers threats. As illustrated by the Sadia
versus Pedigao case and confirmed by our data, most Brazilian companies are still
controlled by a small group of blockholders who could easily coordinate defenses against
outside attacks.125 Nonetheless, the Brazilian anti-takeover clauses show an interesting
effect of ownership structures on corporate governance practices.

VII. THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES

This Section builds on empirical evidence from Brazil to advance theoretical
hypotheses explaining changes in corporate ownership. Ownership structures are key
distinguishing features underlying different forms of capitalism.126 Yet we still know
remarkably little about the motives that drive changes in ownership structures.
123
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Scholars argue that initial patterns of stock ownership tend to create structures and
set rules that contribute to the maintenance of this very pattern of ownership structure.127
According to this thesis, path dependence would prevent changes from occurring. There
could be a critical moment where the costs of adhering to the same structure would
surpass the benefits of adopting a new structure. At this point, the path could be broken,
and dispersed ownership would then develop.128 Ownership structure is then dependent
on prevailing institutions existing in an environment. As we have seen, the persistence of
traditional Brazilian firms in segments of poor corporate governance supports the pathdependence hypotheses.

On the other hand, the significant change towards more

significant levels of ownership dispersion begs the question what the reasons are that
prompted this evolution.
Scholars have recently discussed the preconditions necessary for developing
strong capital markets.129

They have analyzed how institutions affect corporate

ownership and focused their research on legal, social and political institutions. La Porta
et al. have analyzed the factors that may bring about critical change towards dispersed
ownership.130 They argued that protective legal rules would be a key factor in diffusing
ownership. They pointed out that common law countries tend to protect more investors
and stockholders, and therefore have achieved more significant levels of ownership
dispersion.131 Other scholars contend that private regulation by stock exchanges is more
important,132 along with a country’s social norms regarding business behavior.133 And
still others have argued that politics must foster dispersed ownership.134
Understanding the determinants of changes in corporate ownership in Brazil
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requires detailed investigation of several variables that could potentially affect this
outcome.

Some of these may include macro variables such as level of financial

development, tax and competition policy, labor rights, shareholder and debt holder
rights, industrial and trade policy, merger activity, cultural beliefs, political relationships
between dominant families and the power structure, private initiative development, and
listing in outside markets. Some variables may be attributed to micro-related firmspecific characteristics such as company size, age, capital structure, finance needs, level
of private benefits of control extraction, industry segment, and others. While I do not
attempt to test empirically the broad range of theories explaining ownership structure
changes, I explore some potential explanations that are supported by the data raised by
this paper.

a) Merger Activity
Intense merger activity may be related to profound changes in corporate structure.
For instance, scholars attribute the increase of widely held companies to the corporate
reorganization that was necessary to achieve after merger waves in the United States. For
example, the paradigmatic merger of seven steel companies brought about the creation of
a large steel conglomerate with a high level of dispersed shares. No single investor could
own large stakes of ownership in such a large company.135 In the late 1930s, few
corporations had families with controlling stakes, though many still had families
dominating the board of directors.136 In the United Kingdom, Frank, Mayers and Rossi
point out that mergers played a more important role in ownership dilution.137 In Britain,
family ownership shrunk when their holdings were diluted in the process of issuing
shares to acquire other companies.138 Therefore dispersed ownership in Britain was
mainly a product of takeover activity during the twentieth century. Families retained
control through disproportional representation on boards of directors in relation to their
equity in the first half of the century. In the second half of the century, institutional
135
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ownership replaced families and rapidly extinguished their control.139
Although merger waves can quickly change ownership structures, no clear
connection between present changes in Brazilian ownership structures and an
extraordinary upheaval in merger activity exists. Interestingly, a new merger wave is
currently occurring. Companies raised financing in the capital markets over the past two
years. In 2008, fewer companies have gone public on Bovespa due to the decrease of
stock prices in the New York Stock Exchange and Bovespa,140 and many firms have
announced merger plans.141

b) Cross-Listing

Another potential explanation for the upsurge of firms listing on Novo Mercado
could be that corporations are cross-listing. New firms listing in foreign exchanges and
offering equity in other markets must comply with better corporate governance because
of legal and listing requirements of other markets. In this case, the costs of listing on
Novo Mercado would be much smaller to these firms. So, companies listing on Novo
Mercado could be signaling that they would also comply with good corporate governance
in the national market.
However, the data do not support this hypothesis.

The majority of IPOs

conducted in the market was not accompanied by ADRs’ issuance. From the __ IPOs
made on Novo Mercado, only __ were accompanied by listings in international stock
exchanges. Although many offerings were also destined to foreign investors according to
Rule 144-A and Regulation S, these offerings did not require any special effort of
corporate governance compliance to international standards.
c) Life Cycle
The life-cycle theory holds that young corporations are more likely to present
concentrated ownership, while older companies are more likely to be widely held.142 It
139
140
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assumes that large corporations started as family businesses and evolved into widely held
businesses in a few countries with a reasonably long industrial history.143 Implicitly in
this assumption is the fact that during the life cycle of the firm, it will grow and need
increasing levels of capital to perform its activities. Thus, more shareholders will be
needed and the ownership of the firm will increasingly disperse. Analyzing data on
changes of corporate ownership in Australia, Asjeet Lamba and Geof Stapledon show
that the longer a company has been listed on the stock exchange, the more likely the
company is to have a widely held ownership structure.144
Nonetheless, the analysis of Brazilian ownership data does not seem to be
consistent with the life-cycle theory. As we have seen, most companies with dispersed
ownership are new entrants on Novo Mercado. The oldest and the most traditional
Brazilian firms are concentrated on Bovespa’s Level 1 and the standard market. These
firms present very concentrated patterns of corporate control.

Brazilian data also

corroborate the findings of Claessens, Djankov and Lang, who pointed out that in East
Asia, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan, older firms tend to have more
concentrated corporate control.145 This result begs the question on why old firms have
only migrated to Level 1 and not to the most stringent segments. In a sense, this shows
institutional adaptation and stability towards concentration of control. One explanation
could be that these firms have other sources of finance like government credit through the
Brazilian Bank for Social and Economics Development (“BNDES”). They may also
have a history of retained earnings so that they can finance themselves, and therefore do
not need to comply with stricter Novo Mercado rules to get cheaper capital, as new firms
have been doing. Besides, the underlying story also shows the preceding role of the
government in providing capital to captains of industry.

older the corporations in a sample of East Asian companies were less likely to be widely held).
143 See Morck & Steier, supra note 126, at 8. According to this view, Brazilian industrial history, which
developed mainly after the second half of the twentieth century, may still be considered a short one,
providing insufficient time to the development of forces that could drastically change corporate ownership.
144
Asjeet Lamba & Geof Stapledon, The Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: Australian
Evidence __ (The University of Melbourne Faculty of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Group, Paper No. 20, 2001), available at __.
145
Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 105.
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d) Size
The size theory provides that smaller corporations tend to remain family
businesses while larger corporations are more likely to be widely held.146 Several studies
have identified a negative effect of the firm’s size on the level of concentration of
shareholding control. The larger the firm is, a greater dispersion of shareholding control
it will have.147 Demsetz and Lehn, examining a sample of American firms, found greater
diffusion of ownership in larger firms. They noted that the size of the firm, as measured
by the market value of equity is negatively related to ownership concentration.148
Claessens, Djankov and Lang have found that family ownership increases the smaller the
firm is in East Asian countries, especially in Japan.149 Faccio and Land, on the other
hand, demonstrated that family ownership is less likely for larger firms in Western
European corporations, particularly in United Kingdom and Sweden. Large firms are
more likely to be widely held than smaller firms in their sample.150 Also, Asjeet Lamba
and Geof Stapledon show that larger firms are less likely to have a controlling
shareholder in Australia, as they are expected to have issued more shares than smaller
companies.151
This study, on the contrary, finds a positive relation between company size and
control concentration.

Brazilian data show that the largest Brazilian industrial

conglomerates are still controlled by families. They include companies such as Klabin
SA, Votorantim SA and Gerdau SA that are listed on Level 1. Smaller firms tend to need
more capital and therefore have greater incentives to comply with better corporate
governance of Novo Mercado’s at Bovespa to raise capital.

146 See Morck

& Steier, supra note 126, at 8.
See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences. 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Harold Demsetz & B. Villalonga, Ownership Structure and
Corporte Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209 (2001); and Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, European
Patterns of Corporate Ownership: a Twelve-country Study, 28 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 759 (1997).
148
Id. at 1158.
149 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 105.
150
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e) Public or Private Initiative?

At least three conditions are necessary to separate ownership from control. First, the
controlling shareholders must decide to exit. This can be done either by a one-time
liquidation of their stake in a merger transaction, a public offering, or by selling their
stakes in stages onto market.152
Second, there must be demand for the shares. Investors must expect to receive
sufficient financial return in exchange of the risk they are assuming.153
Third, the buyers of the shares must not be inclined to gain control, or otherwise,
concentrated ownership would persist.154

This can happen in two ways: either the

purchaser of the control block is a widely held company itself, or the shares are acquired
by dispersed shareholders in the market.
This process can suffer from State intervention or be privately driven. Having a brief
historical overview on the development of Brazilian markets allows us to assess which
incentives mattered more to promote ownership dispersion.

Brazil has passed two very

different phases characterized by strong concern of market players about promoting its
development. The first phase was characterized by government initiative beginning in
the 1960s. The Brazilian government engaged in many efforts to encourage the growth
of the stock markets. The main strategy was based on tax incentives. Scholars have
already pointed out that tax policy can impact corporate ownership and governance.155 In
the Brazilian situation, tax breaks help explain why companies went public and why there
was demand for shares among investors. The Brazilian government provided a variety of
tax incentives to market players in order to stimulate the offering and demand of publicly
traded securities. Two major sets of tax incentives were enacted, One was the “open
capital companies program,” which provided corporations and their shareholders
152

See Brian R. Cheffins & Steven A. Bank, Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK: The Tax
Dimension, 70 MOD. L. R. 783 (2007).
153
Id.
154 Id. (“The three questions one needs to address to explain why the widely held company might move to
the forefront in a particularly country are: Firstly, why would those owning large blocks want to exit?
Second, were investors willing to buy the shares potentially available for sale? Third, why did the new
investors fail to exercise control themselves?”).
155
Id. at 783 (arguing that taxes imposed on corporate profits, taxation of managerial and investment
income, and inheritance taxes help to explain why ownership separated from control in the UK.) See also
Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups–the Double Taxation of Inter-corporate
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 2004.
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substantial tax benefits if the corporation distributed shares to the public. The second was
the “Decree Law 157 Fiscal Investment Funds program,” according to which taxpayers
could purchase shares of government-approved mutual funds instead of paying taxes that
were due. The mutual funds would then use the tax receipts to acquire shares.156
Through these programs, taxpayers could deduct a percentage of resources spent
for the acquisition of securities from their gross incomes. Trubek explained that Decree
Law 157 provided “forced saving incentives.” The taxpayer would make a deposit in
special mutual investment funds that relieved the taxpayer of her tax liabilities. The tax
deposit would then be employed to acquire securities, and the deposit holder would be
entitled to a tax credit. After holding shares of the mutual investment funds for a
specified time, the taxpayer could redeem the fund shares for cash.157
The government expected that the primary market would develop as a fundraising alternative to private entrepreneurships.158 However, even with the tax incentives,
the market did not experience a sustainable development, apart from occasional activity
brought by Decree Law 157 funds.159
The government then engaged in efforts to pass law reforms that would provide
the regulatory framework for market development. These reforms included the capital
markets law (Law 6385/76) and the corporations law (Law 6404/76).

Musacchio

analyzes the resulting outcome of these regulatory systems and concludes that
shareholder protections did not correlate with stock market development.160
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At the end of the 1990s, Brazilian capital markets experienced a severe crisis.161
Trading activity of Bovespa dropped by 47%,162 and a strong privitization process took
place. At the same time, the few placements of shares that occurred have been conducted
mostly by companies that were listing in the American market. The trading volume of
ADRs increased from 0.3% in 1996 to 33% of the trading volume of Bovespa in 2000.163
Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, one-third of Bovespa’s trading activity had moved to
the American markets. With the failure of the market to provide finance for firms, the
BNDES has become the main source for long-term business finance in Brazil.
This situation threatened Bovespa’s existence and caused it to look for
alternatives that could promote the market. Private efforts had to overcome the failures
of the market. At first, the listing requirements of Bovespa changed. The rationale
behind this change recognized that investors’ risk perception had to be reduced.
Enhancing the confidence of investors in the market would cause share values and
liquidity to increase and encourage companies to issue new shares and go public.164
Bovespa’s special listing segments were originally inspired by the German
Neuer Market.165 Bovespa’s listing levels provide rights to shareholders in addition to
those given by law. These incentives are largely based on voluntary adhesion to stronger
corporate governance that would produce changes in the internal structure of
corporations. In turn, the value of these companies were expected to rise. This rationale
therefore contrasts with the previous approach because now companies were expected to
improve corporate governance in a voluntary way.
In its first years, Bovespa’s new listing levels did not experience significant
adhesions. Some macroeconomic factors, such as the Argentina’s crisis, the domestic
shareholder rights on paper holds, Brazil’s equity markets should have prospered between 1940 and the
1990s, when investor protections were strong . . . , and jumped significantly in size after 2001 (after laws
provided even more protections). But this is clearly not the evolution observed . . . . Some correlation
between the level of stock market development and investor protections on paper is observed, but between
1940 and 1976 there is no correlation at all. Moreover, the period of relatively strong shareholder rights
after 1976 . . . is precisely the period during which Brazil has been portrayed as one of the worst countries
in which to be a small investor.”).
161
See generally Gorga, supra note 20 (describing the context the Brazilian capital markets crisis that led
legislators to propose a new reform in the Corporations and Capital Markets Laws in 2001).
162 Santana, supra note 21, at 3.
163
Santana, supra note 21, at 4.
164
Id. at 8.
165
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energy crisis that required months of electricity rationing, the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001, and the uncertainty brought about by the 2002 domestic
Presidential election, are considered the main factors that generated instability. They
produced an increase in the risk measured by investors, inhibiting companies’ decisions
to go public.166
Nonetheless, Bovespa’s strategy was not limited to the new listing segments, as
one may think. Bovespa also engaged in a series of efforts and alliances with both
private and public agents in order to promote market development. This networking was
critical to the success of the new listing segments, which depended on the support of
other important market players.167
In 2002 Bovespa passed Resolution 282/02-CA, which established that any new
listings of public offerings must be conducted at least on Level 1. Bovespa then heavily
publicized Novo Mercado’s advantages to businessmen, underwriters, domestic and
foreign institutional investors, investors in private equity and venture capital.168
Bovespa sought support from important private players, public institutions and
international organizations to promote its new listing segments. For example, Bovespa
sought support from the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Brasileiro
de Governança Corporativa or “IBGC”).

This institute offered many courses and

lectures on Bovespa’s Novo Mercado.169 Bovespa also sought the support of public
institutions like the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) and the agency responsible
for overseeing Brazilian pension funds (Secretaria de Previdência Complementar).
These two institutions changed regulations on investment of pension funds. The changes
authorized a higher ceiling on stock investments provided that the issuing company was
listed in Novo Mercado or Level 2.170 The National Association of Investment Banks
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Id. at _.
Santana, supra note 21, at 13 (“The Novo Mercado project is based on a market mechanism and so . . .
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(Associação Nacional dos Bancos de Investimento or “ANBID”), the Brazilian equivalent
to the NASD, also provided a key rule: It established that its members could only lead
offers whose issuers were registered at least on Bovespa’s Level 1.171

The practical

effect of this rule was that underwriters would be virtually non-existent for offers in the
traditional market.172
In addition, Bovespa sought support from BNDES. BNDES began granting
specific incentives for companies to join Novo Mercado.

In some cases, BNDES

required companies to adhere to Novo Mercado as a financing condition.173 Bovespa also
relied on the support of the World Bank and OCDE. The Private Sector Advisory Group
on Corporate Governance (“PSAG”). coordinated by these institutions, publicized its
support to Novo Mercado.174
This brief description of the Brazilian experience shows that self-regulation by
stock exchanges, allied with strong support of key market players, was a driving force of
corporate governance and capital markets enhancement. The creation of special listing
segments has provided the first impulse towards an important change in the market.
f) IPO’s Market
Scholars have argued that the absence of an active IPO market may be a reason
why ownership does not widely diffuse in certain countries.175 Strong capital markets are
associated with the entry of new firms.

According to this view, having developed

secondary markets is not enough to promote overall market development. Secondary
market development may be associated with the trading of dual-class shares, which
generate liquidity but do not allow ownership to separate from control.

Therefore,

countries with less developed primary markets will be characterized by concentrated
ownership.
established limits. Even so, those rules were extremely important, because they helped institutionalize, and
give official recommendation to, the existence of the Novo Mercado and the other special segments.”)
171 Id. at 13.
172
In practice this rule has been suffered a flexibilization as underwrites ended up coordinating the issuance
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173
Santana, supra note 21, at 13
174
Id.
175
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Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz investigate how firms evolved in the US from 1970
to 2001 to understand why they became widely held.176 Firms generally do not become
widely held shortly after their IPO.177 They find that about ten years after the IPO,
insiders owning less than 20% of the cash flow rights controlled half of the firms. They
find that firms that have greater financing needs are more likely to become widely held.178
For primary markets to be strong there should be corporations that need to access finance
through public security offerings.

Established companies may have other finance

sources. If finance is supplied by retained earnings, by bank borrowing or by infusion of
private capital, firms will not have the need to go through equity offers.179
Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz attribute the changing dynamics of insider
ownership to stock market variables. Firms become more widely held when the market
of their shares is liquid and they can be sold without significant discount. Demsetz and
Lehn also argued that a greater price of a fraction of the firm reduces the degree to which
ownership is concentrated in their sample of American firms.180
Indeed Novo Mercado’s developments seem to support these arguments. Studies
showed that Novo Mercado’s upsurge listing is indeed associated with the increase in
price of securities obtained in this segment.181 New corporations with demand for capital
constrained could find advantageous conditions to access finance, as Novo Mercado
became an alternative for raising capital, more attractive than the traditional forms of
borrowing at very large interests rates.
The data presented in this paper show that most companies from Novo Mercado
used to be closely held companies.

Novo Mercado is comprised basically of new

publicly held companies aiming at obtaining better prices for their IPOs. Therefore more
dispersed ownership structure is indeed associated with an increase in IPO activity.182 As
176
Jean Helwege, Christo Pirinsky & Rene M. Stulz, Why do Firms Become Widely Held? An analysis of
the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership, 52 J. FIN. 995 (2007).
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181 See, e.g., Miceli da Silveira & Ayres B. de C. Barros, supra note 47, at __; and Gledson de Carvalho &
Pennacchi, supra note 47, at __.
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we have seen, few companies from the traditional market chose to migrate to Novo
Mercado. Older companies maintain high levels of ownership concentration.

g) Decreasing Levels of Private Benefits of Control and Firm Value
Private benefits of control are considered an important determinant of ownership
structures.183 Studies have shown that larger levels of private benefits of control are
increasingly associated with the presence of controlling shareholders.184
The Brazilian experience with different listing segments allows us to test the relation
between private benefits of control and ownership structures. If controlling ownership
structure is decreasing at Novo Mercado, we might expect that private benefits of control
have been diminishing as well. Although we don’t attempt to conduct such analysis here,
an interesting venue would be to compare the amount of private benefits extraction in all
the different listing levels to assess whether they correlate with the level of
concentration/dispersion of ownership achieved in these segments.

h) One Share – One Vote
The possibility that the one share-one vote rule become a mandatory European
Law Rule has reopened a very intense debate. This debate brings to the European context
a series of questions and arguments that were made in the United States few decades ago
in relation to the desirability and the effects generated by the requirement of the one
share-one vote rule by stock exchanges and the security exchange authority.
Several scholars have presented critiques against the adoption of the one share –
one vote rule.185 For instance, it was argued that a mandatory rule could produce backfire
effects such as inducing companies to adopt pyramidal structures, or derivative
183
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instruments that could decompose the effect of such rule.186
On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that deviations from one
share-one vote may be inefficient. Grossman and Hart have showed that because the one
share-one vote protects shareholders’ property rights, value reducing bids are impossible
under this rule. 187 They have also argued that changes that restrict the voting power may
harm security-holders.188

Nonetheless, this literature still admits that in specific

situations, such deviations can be wealth enhancing.189 One example is the initial public
offering by a company of dual class shares, in which the purchasers would reduce the
price of the shares so that the company’s initial owners would bear the cost of the
issuance.
Defendants of the one share-one vote argue that capital market development
requires such arrangement so as to avoid discounts practiced on the value of shares in
environments characterized by this divergence in voting rights. The difference between
control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder is usually associated
with a discount on the value of the shares. Claessens et al. have shown that this discount
increases when the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights is larger.190 They
show that pyramid schemes, cross-holdings among firms and the issuance of dual-class
shares are all associated with lower corporate value, although none of these associations
is statistically significant.191 Nenova focuses her analysis on the effect of dual shares on
private benefits of control, and she finds that non-voting shares are associated with large
value discounts.192
An increasing number of firms in continental Europe have unifyed dualclass shares into a single class. Anete Pajuste presents evidence, based on data of seven
European countries that widely rely on dual-class share structures, that firm value
increases after the unification if compared to the firm itself before the unification,
186
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compared to other dual-class firms.193 Pedersen and Thomsen have found that the use of
dual class shares is positively associated with family ownership. A stronger ownership
concentration is correlated with the existence of dual class shares in a positive way.194
Others have shown that the impact of the one share-one vote depends on the
underlying existing ownership structure. In widely-held companies its adoption may
ensure efficient outcomes in bidding contests meanwhile its deviations may mitigate the
free rider problem and promote takeovers. In companies with concentrated ownership, its
adoption may promote value-increasing control transfers while deviations may exacerbate
conflicts of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority
shareholders.195
Scholars have then argued that the one share-one vote could both discourage and
promote ownership concentration. Because it ties votes to cash flow rights, it increases
the financial burden of the shareholder seeking to keep control. This can bring about two
opposite effects: the shareholder may relinquish control because it is too expensive or he
or she can be reluctant of losing control, which may impede the floating of shares and
perhaps induce a going private transaction.196
Bovespa’s special listing requirements seems to support the argument that the
one share-one vote rule helps to promote the dispersion of ownership.197 This study
provides evidence that the adoption of the one share – one vote rule is indeed associated
with a larger diffusion of ownership. This rule has promoted ownership dispersion, as it
requires that controlling shareholders reduce their voting power if they want to raise
significant amount of capital at Novo Mercado. In the other listing segments that don’t
require compliance with the one share-one vote rule, alternatively, block holders tend to
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retain their controlling position and be reluctant to float shares.198

i) Controlling Shareholders Preferences and Incentives
Controlling shareholders bear significant costs from maintaining concentration
of ownership and voting rights. They incur in costs of holding a nondiversified portfolio,
costs of the lack of liquidity of their investment and costs from the necessity of
monitoring the operation of the company, so as to assure that they will derive profits from
their investment.

Therefore, controlling shareholders benefit by extracting private

benefits from the corporation in exchange for incurring these costs.199
Some level of benefits extraction may be efficient to the corporation and to noncontrolling shareholders as well. The controlling shareholders may do a better job in
policing the management of public corporations than what market-oriented techniques
would achieve in firms with dispersed ownership. The controlling shareholders have
lower information costs and have incentives to watch closely what is happening in the
corporation and, therefore, they may catch earlier problems that would interfere in the
corporate results. In this view, controlling shareholders would be an efficient alternative
to the problem of separating of ownership and control that arise from widely-held
shareholdings. They would increase productivity generating gains to non-controlling
shareholders as well.200

Non-controlling shareholders would actually prefer having

controlling shareholders controlling the corporation as long as their benefits would
exceed the costs that they generate to non-controlling shareholders. Therefore, noncontrolling shareholders would prefer having controlling shareholders manage the
corporation provided that the gains from the reduction in managerial agency costs are
198
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superior to the private benefits that controlling shareholders extract.201 This equation is
what Professors Gilson and Gordon have called “the controlling shareholder trade off.”202
Using this framework, a corporate governance system should achieve a positive
trade off from controlling shareholders structures. To put it differently, the problem is
transforming a structure of inefficient controlling shareholders, who were used to extract
large amounts of private benefits of control, into a structure of efficient controlling
shareholders, who generated benefits from more focused monitoring that exceedes the
costs of private benefits extraction. This would cause minority shareholders to be better
off from the controlling shareholders’ management, raising the overall level of
confidence in the capital markets.203
Gilson’s hypothesizes that there should be more diversity of shareholding
distribution among companies in an efficient controlling shareholder system. He gives as
example the case of Sweden and Italy, showing that Sweden (a good law nation) has
considerable more widely held ownership than Italy (a bad law nation), despite the fact
that both countries are considered controlling shareholders oriented systems. According
to Gilson’s hypothesis, inefficient controlling shareholders systems show less diversity of
shareholding distribution.204
Likewise, the fact that we find more diversity in the ownership structure of
Brazilian corporations today than in a few years ago appears to support the hypothesis
that controlling shareholders structures have moved to more efficient patterns because of
relevant changes in the level of shareholder protection and consequent reduction of
pecuniary private benefits of control. Investors pay more for Novo Mercado’s shares
because they consider that the level of pecuniary expropriation they will be subjected to
is not the same as it used to be.
Gilson also distinguishes between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits
of control to explain differences between the incidences of controlling shareholders in
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certain countries.205 Non pecuniary benefits such as social status play an important role in
Brazil. High levels of non-pecuniary private benefits of control should decrease the rate
at which controlling shareholders and their heirs dissipate control.206 This may be an
important factor to explain why Level 1 companies still persist with very concentrated
structures of ownership.

Level 1’s companies consist of very traditional Brazilian

companies, whose controlling shareholders have social status and exert political
influences.
Even if there are evidences that listing on Novo Mercado diminishes the cost of
capital to companies, pecuniary incentives may not be enough for changing the mind of
traditional controlling shareholders that still enjoy non-pecuniary advantages from their
positions. But it is important to note, that even if social status and political relations are
considered non-pecuniary private benefits, they may result in gains that can be easily
translated into pecuniary benefits. The concentration of corporate control and assets in
the hands of few families creates the opportunity for them to lobby government agencies
for special treatment. They can demand preferential public contracts and non-marketbased financing from state banks, which will lead them to weakly rely on equity
finance.207 Ultimately, families may have a significant influence upon governmental
economic policy. This motivation for crony capitalism can also explain why many
companies still continue to have families as their major controlling shareholders, as it
happens in Level 1.208 In this framework, changes in ownership structure may be more
difficult to achieve and require more time to succeed. Controlling shareholders tastes
therefore may be more difficult to change if they are not constrained by the need of
getting more capital at lower costs.
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VIII.

THE CHALLENGES THAT THE MARKET WILL FACE

Novo Mercado has achieved 20% of Bovespa’s market capitalization in 8 years.
This is a very significant change that happened in a considerable fast period of time
period of time. For this outcome to be improved, many challenges will have to be faced
by regulators and market participants.
It is still unclear that Bovespa’s legal rules will achieve their desirable
enforcement.209 Bovespa has established an arbitration panel to circumvent the delay and
uncertainty of Brazilian courts. However, up to now, this arbitration panel has never
been installed and it is unsure whether it is going to work properly in practice.
The Brazilian Corporate Law was envisaged based on the figure of the classical
controlling shareholder.

Brazilian law imposes more responsibilities to controlling

shareholders, and less so to managers. However, as ownership structures changes, this
legal model is challenged. Many problems that may emerge in companies without clear
controlling shareholders will present significant difficulties for the current law’s
framework in place. For instance, the Brazilian Law affords tag along rights to minority
shareholders in case of sale of control. Control transactions usually involved more than
50% of the voting shares of the corporation. With the increasing level of ownership
dispersion, it will be more difficult to assess when a sale of control is taking place. Is a
sale of 30% of the voting shares still a control sale? And what about a sale of 10% of the
voting shares? And about 10% of voting shares by a shareholder participating in a
control shareholder agreement’?210 There is still no clear criteria according to which one
could solve these questions.

There is a lot of room to opposing arguments.

The

definition of independent directors, the adoption of shareholders’ agreements that bind
directors and the use and enforcement of anti-takeover clauses211 raise important
questions for regulators and market players.
Also, many issues are poorly regulated.

One example that brought recent

attention by the midia has to do with practices of underwriters in the issuance of
209

Cosan case.
recent case.
211
Totvs case.
210 VCP
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securities like lending capital to the issuers, receiving warrants as compensation, etc.

IX. CONCLUSION

Departing from a unique vantage point, this paper aims at drawing general
conclusions from the Brazilian experience of changing patterns of corporate ownership.
Designing special listing segments with higher standards of corporate governance
appears to be an important solution for fostering markets stuck in low-level equilibrium
due to poor protection of minority shareholders and poor corporate governance. The
Bovespa experiment has shown that many new companies have chosen to adhere to
special segments characterized by more stringent corporate governance practices than the
ones adopted by companies in the standard market. They are looking for finance in the
capital markets instead of making use of their usual alternatives (e.g., debt). So, private
regulation may work where public regulation has failed to foster market development.
Nonetheless, this paper cautions that the majority of traditional companies have
not yet migrated to Bovespa’s new listing segments the way players of the market were
expecting them to do. This shows that path dependence still applies: firms tend to persist
with their patterns of initial ownership and changes in corporate governance practices that
depend on changes in ownership structures may remain hard to achieve.
Brazilian capital markets are going through an important change. The “new
entrants” have caused the level of ownership concentration to significantly diminish in
Novo Mercado. However this change is accompanied by persistence of the traditional
concentration of ownership in Level 2, Level 1 and the standard market. Therefore, we
find that new practices of corporate governance coexisting with old practices. We find
institutional adaptation towards better governance patters, however family ownership is
still dominant and stable.
This paper also identifies an important challenge for the corporate governance
literature in general. Corporate governance scholars have restricted their research to
companies’ charters and bylaws. The analysis of shareholders’ agreements in Brazil
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points out that the contractual relations that affect corporate governance may be more
complex than typically expected. An analysis of Brazilian corporate governance that
does not take shareholders’ agreements into consideration is certainly incomplete.
Shareholders’ agreements are central in assessing the concentration of corporate control
in Brazil. Whether this also applies to assessing corporate governance in other countries
is still an open question that deserves more attention from researchers.
Shareholders’ agreements are used by companies with a larger degree of
ownership dispersion as mechanisms that coordinate joint control and voting rights. In
this sense shareholders’ agreements substitute share ownership.

Furthermore, this

analysis makes it clear that control comes in forms other than direct or indirect equity
ownership (pyramids).

It may rely on a contractual basis through a shareholders

agreement. In addition, shareholders’ agreements greatly affect how directors can vote,
making them representatives of shareholders’ interests and largely undermining their
independence.
Anti-takeover defenses have been cropping up in companies bylaws, which is a
remarkable development of increasing dispersion of ownership. We still have to wait to
see how they will affect potential attempts of takeover or sales of control. It is unclear
whether public regulation will evolve to tackle this phenomenon. Private actors seem to
have not yet realized how anti-takeover defenses may adversely affect the development
of the market, by increasing the entrenchment of managers.
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TABLE 1 : Main Aspects of Bovespa’s Listing Rules
Main Aspects of the Listing Rules

Standard

Level 1

Level 2

Novo
Mercado

Disclosure of conditions of related party transactions.
Monthly disclosure of transactions with shares of the company by employees, administrators and Fiscal
Counselors.
Disclosure of quantity and characteristics of securities issued by the company held by controlling shareholders
members of the Board, officers and members of the Fiscal Counsel..
Improvements in quarterly financial statements, including consolidated financial statements and report of the
Independent Auditor
The Company’s quarterly and year-end financial statements will include a Cash Flow Statement

not required
not required

required
required

required
required

required
required

not required

required

required

required

not required

required

required

required

not required

required

required

required

Quarterly Statements should be presented in English or prepared in accordance with the US GAAP or IFRS
Disclosure of annual balance sheet according to standards of US GAAP or IFRS.
Free-float

not required
not required

not required
not required

required
required

required
required

Maintenance of a free-float of at least 25% of the capital.
Capital Dispersion

not required

required

required

required

Public offerings have to use mechanisms the favor capital dispersion.
Board of Directors

not required

required

required

required

Establishment of a two-year unified mandate for the entire Board of Directors, which must have five members at
least, from which at least 20% (twenty percent) shall be Independent Members.
Corporate Rules

not required

not required

required

required

Voting rights granted to preferred shares in circumstances such as incorporation, spin-off and merger and
approval of contracts between the company and other firms of the same holding group.

not required

not required

required

not
applicable

Obligation to hold a tender offer for acquisition of the shares held by the other shareholders at the economic
value of the shares

not required

not required

required

required

In a sale of control, same conditions provided to majority shareholders will have to be extended to all
shareholders (Tag Along).

not required

not required

not required

required

In case majority shareholders sell their stake, same conditions granted of price must be extended to common
shareholders, while preferred shareholders must get, at least, 80% of the price (tag along).

not required

not required

required

not
applicable

The company should have a publicly shareholder meeting with analysts and investors, at least once a year.
Arbitration

not required

required

required

required

Admission to the Market Arbitration Panel for resolution of corporate disputes.
Annual Calendar

not required

not required

required

required

Disclosure of an annual calendar of corporate events.
One Share – One Vote
The capital stock must be solely represented by common shares (voting shares).
Source: author’s elaboration based on Bovespa’s rules

not required

required

required

required

not required

not required

not required

required

Disclosure
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TABLE 2
Number of Public Companies Listed on Bovespa
Number of Brazilian public companies listed on the indicated Bovespa levels. Data is provided
by Bovespa, and is at year-end except for 2007.

Bovespa Listing Segments
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Standard
577
589
595
599
534
495
450
407
374
343
316
300
293

Novo
Total
Mercado
577
589
these levels were created in
595
2000
599
534
0
0
0
495
18
0
0
468
24
3
2
436
31
3
2
410
33
7
7
390
37
10
18
381
36
14
44
394
44
20
92
449

Level 1

Level 2

Source: Bovespa (considerado até final de dezembro)
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TABLE 3
Primary Stock Offerings
STOCKS
Volume
YEAR

Number of
Issuances

R$ millions

US$ millions

31
22
23
20
10
6
6
4
2
9
13
29
59

1.935,25
9.142,96
3.599,21
4.112,10
2.749,45
1.410,17
1.353,30
1.050,44
230,00
4.469,90
4.364,63
13.745,58
33.135,84

2.111,10
9.168,27
3.655,44
3.494,52
1.467,83
628,24
625,24
370,12
73,76
1.552,03
1.860,86
6.565,67
17.253,01

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Source: CVM

TABLE 4
Secondary Stock Offerings
Secondary Distributions
(Stocks)
YEAR

Volume

No. of registered
distributions

R$ millions

0
2
0
14
14
14
7
2
6
12
15
30
44

0
37,9
0
1.856,30
1.866,60
12.127,30
4.308,70
5.096,80
1.856,30
4.682,30
6.634,60
12.760,80
34.121,3

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

US$
millions
0
37,2
0
1.618,00
1.065,50
6.726,00
1.768,20
2.158,60
614,40
1.611,60
2.792,20
5.878,70
18.211,4

Source: CVM
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TABLE 5
Recent IPOs
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA

Year
2007

Company’s Name

Listing Segment

Offer Type

Volume R$
millions

Nº of brokers

No. of investors
investidores

Tempo Part

Novo Mercado

Primary

394

57

N/D

MPX Energia

Novo Mercado

Primary

1.916

58

N/D

BMF

Novo Mercado

Secundary

5.984

70

255.001

Level 1

Primary

680

61

N/D

BDR

Primary

508

52

563

Helbor

Novo Mercado

Primary

252

60

723

Amil

Novo Mercado

Mixed

1.401

69

4.398

BR Brokers

Novo Mercado

Mixed

699

55

13

Bovespa Hld

Novo Mercado

Secundary

6.626

69

64.775

BDR

Primary

666

55

805

Novo Mercado

Primary

506

67

13.177

Level 2

Mixed

413

61

3.709

Tenda

Novo Mercado

Primary

603

60

10.172

Trisul

Novo Mercado

Primary

330

62

2.444

BicBanco

Level 1

Mixed

822

62

5.197

Sul America

Level 2

Primary

775

67

19.261

Novo Mercado

Mixed

398

59

-

BDR

Primary

275

59

1572

Level 2

Mixed

447

64

10.890

Novo Mercado

Primary

287

59

4.999

Level 2

Mixed

925

66

24.419

Providencia

Novo Mercado

Primary

469

64

11.135

Springs

Novo Mercado

Mixed

656

69

7.383

ABC Brasil

Level 2

Mixed

609

49

6.050

Triunfo Part

Novo Mercado

Mixed

513

59

7.139

Guarani

Novo Mercado

Primary

666

63

12.388

Kroton

Level 2

Mixed

479

60

11.297

Novo Mercado

Mixed

1.193

60

15.657

BDR

Mixed

539

56

2.846

Minerva

Novo Mercado

Mixed

444

62

11.660

Invest Tur

Novo Mercado

Primary

945

53

17

Redecard

Novo Mercado

Mixed

4.643

67

29.766

Indusval

Level 1

Mixed

253

59

290

Panamericano
Laep

Agrenco
Marisa
SEB

Satipel
Cosan Ltd
Estacio Part
Generalshopp
Multiplan

MRV
Patagonia

75

Tegma

Novo Mercado

Mixed

Marfrig

Novo Mercado

Daycoval
Cruzeiro Sul

604

64

6.776

Primary

1.021

62

4.933

Level 1

Mixed

1.092

62

7.585

Level 1

Mixed

574

61

4.221

EZTec

Novo Mercado

Primary

542

62

5.553

Log-In

Novo Mercado

Mixed

848

67

26.898

SLC Agricola

Novo Mercado

Mixed

490

64

9.750

Level 1

Primary

529

50

8.586

Novo Mercado

Primary

756

60

9.614

Tarpon

BDR

Primary

444

56

10.714

Sofisa

Level 1

Mixed

439

61

7.269

BDR

Secundary

706

57

11.915

Cremer

Novo Mercado

Mixed

508

58

9.419

Agra Incorp

Novo Mercado

Mixed

786

62

5.375

CR2

Novo Mercado

Primary

308

58

2.810

Bematech

Novo Mercado

Mixed

407

60

8.718

Metalfrio

Novo Mercado

Mixed

453

65

9.672

JHSF Part

Novo Mercado

Primary

432

66

4.561

Fer Heringer

Novo Mercado

Mixed

304

64

9.275

BR Malls Par

Novo Mercado

Mixed

657

66

13.909

Even

Novo Mercado

Primary

460

65

11.366

Pine

Level 1

Mixed

517

55

20.251

JBS

Novo Mercado

Mixed

1.617

61

22.984

Level 2

Mixed

512

60

13.742

GVT Holding

Novo Mercado

Primary

1.076

59

14.597

Sao Martinho

Novo Mercado

Mixed

424

64

24.686

Iguatemi

Novo Mercado

Primary

549

64

16.889

Tecnisa

Novo Mercado

Mixed

791

66

17.436

CC Des Imob

Novo Mercado

Mixed

522

63

22.294

Rodobensimob

Novo Mercado

Primary

449

62

14.181

PDG Realt

Novo Mercado

Mixed

648

62

12.018

Dufrybras

BDR

Secundary

880

60

10.177

Lopes Brasil

Novo Mercado

Secundary

475

59

9.930

Positivo Inf

Novo Mercado

Mixed

604

61

18.814

Odontoprev

Novo Mercado

Mixed

522

55

8.860

Ecodiesel

Novo Mercado

Primary

379

58

9.446

Terna Part

Level 2

Mixed

627

52

6.509

Parana
Inpar S/A

Wilson Sons

Anhanguera

2006

76

Profarma

Novo Mercado

Mixed

401

53

4.609

Brascan Res

Novo Mercado

Mixed

1.188

54

4.319

M.Diasbranco

Novo Mercado

Secundary

411

56

3.460

Santos Bras

Level 2

Mixed

933

54

4.209

Klabinsegall

Novo Mercado

Mixed

527

53

4.720

Medial Saude

Novo Mercado

Mixed

742

53

3.131

Abyara

Novo Mercado

Primary

164

41

6

MMX Miner

Novo Mercado

Primary

1.119

35

18

Datasul

Novo Mercado

Mixed

317

52

5.514

GP Invest

BDR

Primary

706

49

2.373

Lupatech

Novo Mercado

Mixed

453

55

11.453

BrasilAgro

Novo Mercado

Primary

583

35

3

CSU CardSyst

Novo Mercado

Mixed

341

57

14.637

ABnote

Novo Mercado

Secundary

480

55

15.453

Level 2

Mixed

540

56

7.521

Totvs

Novo Mercado

Mixed

460

57

16.322

Company

Novo Mercado

Mixed

282

55

13.166

Gafisa

Novo Mercado

Mixed

927

57

14.028

Copasa

Novo Mercado

Primary

813

60

15.802

Vivax

Level 2

Mixed

529

50

7.916

UOL

Level 2

Mixed

625

56

13.234

Cosan

Novo Mercado

Primary

886

52

9.079

Nossa Caixa

Novo Mercado

Secundary

954

54

7.666

OHL Brasil

Novo Mercado

Mixed

496

42

1.084

Energias BR

Novo Mercado

Mixed

1.185

44

468

Level 2

Mixed

548

48

1.212

Localiza

Novo Mercado

Secundary

265

48

809

Submarino

Novo Mercado

Mixed

473

52

4.022

Renar

Novo Mercado

Primary

16

42

1.698

Porto Seguro

Novo Mercado

Mixed

377

51

5.919

DASA

Novo Mercado

Mixed

437

44

2.892

Grendene

Novo Mercado

Secundary

617

56

7.905

CPFL Energia

Novo Mercado

Mixed

821

47

2.750

ALL Amer Lat

Level 2

Mixed

588

33

3.425

Gol

Level 2

Mixed

878

40

11.397

Novo Mercado

Secundary

768

32

4.445

Equatorial

2005

TAM S/A

2004

Natura

77

Source: Bovespa, Dec., 20th 2007, http://www.bovespa.com.br/Principal.asp
* Dados Preliminares
1. Volume financeiro total da operação
2. Número de corretoras que participaram do consórcio de distribuição
3. Número de investidores participantes do varejo (pessoas físicas + clubes de investimento)
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TABLE 6
Bovespa’s Segments Market Capitalization
Market Capitalization ($ in millions) of Bovespa’s standard market, Level 1, Level 2 and Novo
Mercado. Companies with a majority shareholder have a shareholder that owns more than 50%
of the voting capital.

Market Capitalization
LEVEL

Companies with majority
shareholder
No. of
firms
27
14
31
133

Market Capitalization
em R$
189.048.042.839,36
54.079.710.040,99
631.755.247.320,61
793.629.042.667,36

Companies without a
majority shareholder
No. of
firms
65
6
13
50

Market Capitalization
em R$
240.244.243.754,94
23.798.197.688,22

Total Sample
No. of
firms
92

Market Capitalization
em R$
429.292.286.594,30
77.877.907.729,21
878.701.021.827,92
923.322.371.603,29

Novo Mercado
Level 2
20
44
Level 1
246.945.774.507,31
183
Standard
129.693.328.935,93
205
339
TOTAL
1.668.512.042.868,32
134
640.681.544.886,40
2.309.193.587.754,72
Source: Author’s calculations are based on Bovespa data on market capitalization dated Dec. 19, 2007.

.
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TABLE 7
Listing History of Companies Listed on Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1

Company´s name

Sector Classification

Date of
CVM
Register
(d /m /y)

Initial Date in
the Special
Segment

Previously
Listed
Standard
Market

24/7/2006

27/7/2006

NO

20/7/2007

23/7/2007

NO

19/4/2007

26/4/2007

NO

12/4/2006

27/4/2006

NO

24/10/2007

29/10/07

NO

26/7/2007

8/8/2007

NO

20/7/1977

28/6/2006

YES_STAND

14/10/2005

28/10/2005

NO

17/4/2007

19/4/2007

NO

28/11/2007

30/11/2007

NO

23/10/2007

26/10/2007

NO

4/1/2006

5/4/2007

NO

11/9/2006

23/10/2006

NO

26/10/2007

29/10/2007

NO

9/11/2006

22/11/2006

NO

25/4/2006

2/5/2006

NO

29/1/2007

31/1/2007

NO

12/7/2007

16/07/2007

NO

19/12/2000

01/02/2002

NO

20/07/1977
26/1/2005

16/5/2007

YES_STAND

25/7/2007

27/7/2007

NO

NEW MARKET
ABYARA PLANEJAMENTO IMOBILIARIO S.A.
AÇÚCAR GUARANI S.A.
AGRA EMPREENDIMENTOS IMOBILIARIOS
S.A.
AMERICAN BANKNOTE S.A.
AMIL PARTICIPACOES S.A.
B2W - COMPANHIA GLOBAL DO VAREJO
BCO BRASIL S.A.
BCO NOSSA CAIXA S.A.
BEMATECH IND E COM EQUIP. ELETRONIC
S.A.

BOLSA DE MERCADORIAS E FUTUROS-BMF
S.A.

BOVESPA HOLDING S.A.

BR MALLS PARTICIPACOES S.A.
BRASCAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES S.A.

BRASIL BROKERS PARTICIPACOES S.A.
BRASIL ECODIESEL IND COM
BIO.OL.VEG.S.A.
BRASILAGRO - CIA BRAS DE PROP
AGRICOLAS
CAMARGO CORREA DESENV. IMOBILIARIO
S.A.
CIA BRAS DESENV. IMOBILIARIO TURISTICO

CIA CONCESSÕES RODOVIÁRIAS
CIA. HERING
CIA. PROVIDÊNCIA INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO

Construction
Real Estate Construction
Food Manufacturing
Sugar Manufacturing
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Finance and Insurance
Credit Card Issuing
Health
Medical and Diagnostics
Services
Retail trade
Miscellaneous products
Finance and Insurance
Commercial Banking
Finance and Insurance
Commercial Banking
Manufacturing
Computer and Computer
Peripheral Equipment and
Software Merchant Wholesalers
Financial Activities
Development and Management
of Trading Systems
Clearing House Services for
Securities and Derivative
Products
Financial Activities
Holding Company
Processing, Reserve and
Clearing House Activities
Real Estate and Rental and
Leasing
Holding Company
Construction
Offices of Other Holding
Companies
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Real Estate Agents and Brokers
Real Estate Holdings
Grain and Oilseed Milling
Real Estate and Rental and
Leasing
Agriculture business
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Insurance and Finance
Real Estate and Rental and
Leasing
Highway, Street, and Bridge
Construction
Holding Company
Textile Mills
Clothing and apparel
manufacturing
Plastics Pipe, Pipe Fitting, and
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CIA SANEAMENTO BASICO EST SAO PAULO

CIA SANEAMENTO DE MINAS GERAISCOPASA MG
COMPANY S.A.
CONSTRUTORA TENDA S.A.
COSAN S.A. INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO
CPFL ENERGIA S.A.
CR2 EMPREENDIMENTOS IMOBILIARIOS
S.A.
CREMER S.A.
CSU CARDSYSTEM S.A.
CYRELA COMMERCIAL PROPERT S.A. EMPR
PART
CYRELA BRAZIL REALTY S.A.EMPREEND E
PART
DATASUL S.A.
DIAGNOSTICOS DA AMERICA S.A.
DROGASIL S.A.
EDP - ENERGIAS DO BRASIL S.A.
EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRAS DE
AERONAUTICA S.A.
ETERNIT S.A.
EVEN CONSTRUTORA E INCORPORADORA
S.A.
EZ TEC EMPREEND. E PARTICIPACOES S.A.
FERTILIZANTES HERINGER S.A.
GAFISA S.A.
GENERAL SHOPPING BRASIL S.A.

GRENDENE S.A.
GVT (HOLDING) S.A.

Unlaminated Profile Shape
Manufacturing
Commercial and manufacturing
Administration of Air and Water
Resource and Solid Waste
Management Programs
Water and Sewer Line and
Related Structures Construction
Administration of Air and Water
Resource and Solid Waste
Management Programs
Water and Sewer Line and
Related Structures Construction
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Incorporation, Management,
Real Estate Trading
Food Manufacturing
Sugar Manufacturing
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Medical, and Hospital Supplies
Manufacturing
Finance and Insurance
Credit Card Issuing
Commercial and Industrial
Buildings Rental
Shopping centers, warehouses
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Computer and Computer
Peripheral Equipment and
Software Merchant Wholesalers
Medical and Diagnostic
Laboratories
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries
Merchant Wholesalers
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Aircraft Manufacturing
Aircraft Engine and Engine Parts
Manufacturing
Cement and Concrete Product
Manufacturing and Wholesaler
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Construction
Fertilizer Manufacturing and
Wholesaler
Real Estate Property Managers
Residential Properties
Management of Companies and
Enterprises
Management of Shopping
Centers
Footwear Manufacturing
Rubber and Plastics Footwear
Manufacturing
Telecommunications
Wired Telecommunications
Carriers

27/6/1994

24/4/2002

YES_STAND

17/9/2003

8/2/2006

3/9/2001

2/3/2006

NO

11/10/2007

15/10/2007

NO

26/10/2005

18/11/2005

NO

18/5/2000

29/9/2004

YES_STAND

16/4/2007

23/4/2007

NO

30/6/2006

30/4/2007

NO

25/4/2006

2/5/2006

NO

1/8/2007

9/8/2007

NO

7/7/1994

21/9/2005

NO

30/5/2006

2/6/2006

NO

5/11/2004

19/11/2004

NO

20/7/1977

3/7/2007

YES_STAND

5/7/2005

13/7/2005

NO

23/5/2006

6/6/2006

NO

17/11/1970*

17/8/2006

YES_STAND

2/3/2007

2/4/2007

NO

15/6/2007

22/6/2007

NO

10/4/2007

12/4/2007

NO

21/2/1997

17/2/2006

NO

26/7/2007

30/7/2007

NO

26/10/2004

29/10/2004

NO

9/6/2006

15/2/2007

NO

NO

81

HELBOR EMPREENDIMENTOS S.A.
IGUATEMI EMPRESA DE SHOPPING
CENTERS S.A
INDUSTRIAS ROMI S.A.
INPAR S.A.
JBS S.A.
JHSF PARTICIPACOES S.A.
KLABIN SEGALL S.A.
LIGHT S.A.
LOCALIZA RENT A CAR S.A.
LOG-IN LOGISTICA INTERMODAL S.A.
LOJAS RENNER S.A.
LPS BRASIL - CONSULTORIA DE IMOVEIS
S.A.
LUPATECH S.A.
M.DIAS BRANCO S.A. IND COM DE
ALIMENTOS
MARFRIG FRIGORIFICOS E COM DE ALIM
S.A.
MARISA S.A.
MRV ENGENHARIA E PARTICIPACOES S.A.
MEDIAL SAUDE S.A.
METALFRIO SOLUTIONS S.A.
MINERVA S.A.
MMX MINERACAO E METALICOS S.A.
MPX ENERGIA S.A.
NATURA COSMETICOS S.A.
OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN BRASIL S.A.
ODONTOPREV S.A.
PDG REALTY S.A. EMPREEND E
PARTICIPACOES
PERDIGAO S.A.
PORTO SEGURO S.A.
POSITIVO INFORMATICA S.A.
PROFARMA DISTRIB PROD
FARMACEUTICOS S.A.
REDECARD S.A.
RENAR MACAS S.A.
RODOBENS NEGOCIOS IMOBILIARIOS S.A.

Holdings
Real Estate Incorporation,
Management, and Trading.
Activities Related to Real Estate
Real Estate Agents and Brokers.
Property Managers
Management Shopping Centers
Industrial Machinery
Manufacturing
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Meat and Meat Product
Merchant Wholesalers
Livestock Merchant Wholesalers
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Passenger Car Rental
Water transportation
Department Stores
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Industrial Machinery and
Equipment
Food Manufacturing
Meat and Meat Product
Textile, Apparel and Footwear
Holding Company
Engineering Services
Medical and Diagnostic Services
Household Refrigerator and
Home Freezer Manufacturing
Meat and Meat Product
Merchant Wholesalers
Mining (except Oil and Gas)
Holdings
Electric Power
Holding Company
Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and
Perfume Wholesalers
Construction
Management public service
Health Care Plans
Dental services
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Meat and Meat Product
Insurance
Health and Welfare Funds
Holdings
Computer and Electronic
Product Manufacturing
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries
Merchant Wholesalers
Financial Transactions
Processing, Reserve, and
Clearinghouse Activities
Apple Orchards
Construction

09/07/2007

29/10/2007

NO

2/2/2007

7/2/2007

NO

19/4/1938*

23/3/2007

YES_STAND

23/5/2007

6/6/2007

NO

27/3/2007

29/3/2007

NO

4/4/2007

12/4/2007

NO

14/8/2006

9/10/2006

NO

25/11/1968*

22/02/2006

YES_STAND

6/5/2005
4/6/2007
20/7/1977

23/5/2005
21/6/2007
1/7/2005

NO
NO
YES_STAND

12/12/2006

18/12/2006

NO

8/5/2006

15/5/2006

NO

11/10/2006

18/10/2006

NO

18/6/2007

29/6/2007

NO

13/06/2007

22/10/2007

NO

13/7/2007
19/6/2006

23/7/2007
28/9/2006

NO
NO

10/4/2007

13/4/2007

NO

18/7/2007

20/7/2007

NO

10/11/1998

24/7/2006

NO

07/12/2007

14/12/2007

NO

21/5/2004

26/5/2004

NO

6/7/2005

15/7/2005

NO

13/6/2006

1/12/2006

NO

23/1/2007

26/1/2007

NO

24/6/1997*

12/4/2006

YES_STAND

28/11/1997

22/11/2004

NO

6/12/2006

11/12/2006

NO

24/10/2006

26/10/2006

NO

11/7/2007

13/7/2007

NO

28/12/2004
18/1/2007

28/2/2005
31/1/2007

NO
NO

82

Real Estate Construction
ROSSI RESIDENCIAL S.A.
SAO CARLOS EMPREEND E PARTICIPACOES
S.A.
SAO MARTINHO S.A.
SATIPEL INDUSTRIAL S.A.
SLC AGRICOLA S.A.
SPRINGS GLOBAL PARTICIPACOES S.A.
TECNISA S.A.
TEGMA GESTAO LOGISTICA S.A.
TEMPO PARTICIPACOES S.A.

TPI - TRIUNFO PARTICIP. E INVEST. S.A.
TOTVS S.A.
TRACTEBEL ENERGIA S.A.
TRISUL S.A.
WEG S.A.

Company´s name

Construction
Real Estate Construction
Management, Rental, Selling
and Purchase of Commercial
Property
Sugar and Ethanol (Alcohol)
Manufacturing
Paper and Paper Product
Merchant Wholesalers
Corn, Cotton Manufacturing and
Soybeans and Coffee Processing
Textile and Fabric Finishing
Mills
Construction
Holding
Highway, Street, and Bridge
Construction
Healthcare
Hospital, Medical and
Diagnostics Services
Holding Company
Other Support Activities for
Road Transportation
Management
Computer Systems Design and
Related Services
Electric Power Generation
Construction
Real Estate Construction
Electric Power Generation and
Distribution
Motor Manufacturing
Holding

Sector Classification

1/7/1997

27/1/2006

YES_STAND

25/3/1991

14/12/2006

YES_STAND

7/2/2007

12/2/2007

NO

10/09/2007

21/09/2007

NO

12/6/2007

15/6/2007

NO

25/7/2007

27/7/2007

NO

9/1/2007

1/2/2007

NO

28/6/2007

3/7/2007

NO

04/01/2006

18/12/2007

NO

5/12/2002

23/7/2007

NO

7/3/2006

9/3/2006

NO

28/5/1998

16/11/2005

YES_STAND

10/10/2007

15/10/2007

NO

9/2/1982

22/7/2007

YES_STAND

Date of
CVM
Register
(d /m /y)

Initial Date in
the Special
Segment

Previously
Listed
Standard
market

2/7/1998

25/6/2004

YES_STAND

8/6/2001

12/3/2007

NO

23/7/2007

25/7/2007

NO

26/3/1973*

26/6/2002

YES_STAND

19/8/1993

13/12/2004

YES_STAND

30/3/2006

3/4/2006

NO

26/7/2007

30/7/2007

NO

9/6/2004

24/6/2004

NO

1/12/1998

23/07/2007

NO

LEVEL 2
ALL AMERICA LATINA LOGISTICA S.A.
ANHANGUERA EDUCACIONAL
PARTICIPACOES S.A
BCO ABC BRASIL S.A.
CENTRAIS ELET DE SANTA CATARINA S.A.

ELETROPAULO METROP. ELET. SAO PAULO
S.A.

EQUATORIAL ENERGIA S.A.
ESTACIO PARTICIPACOES S.A.
GOL LINHAS AEREAS INTELIGENTES S.A.
KROTON EDUCACIONAL S.A.

Construction and Transports
Management and Holdings
Educational Services
Holdings
Banking services
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Public service facilities
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Educational Services
Holdings
Scheduled Passenger Air
Transportation
Management and Holdings
Educational Services
Holdings
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MARCOPOLO S.A.
MULTIPLAN - EMPREEND IMOBILIARIOS
S.A.
NET SERVICOS DE COMUNICACAO S.A.
SANTOS BRASIL PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
SARAIVA S.A. LIVREIROS EDITORES
SEB - SISTEMA EDUCACIONAL BRASILEIRO
S.A
SUL AMERICA S.A.
SUZANO PETROQUIMICA S.A.
TAM S.A.
TERNA PARTICIPACOES S.A.
UNIVERSO ONLINE S.A.

Company´s name

Bus and Other Motor Vehicle
Transit Systems
Real Estate and Management of
Shopping Centers
Television Broadcasting
Cable and Other Subscription
Programming
Metal Container Logistics
Seaport
Books Printing
Books Seller
Educational Services
Holdings
Insurance
Offices of Other Holding
Companies
Petrochemical Manufacturing
Passenger Air Transportation
Goods Air Transportation
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Holdings
Broadcasting Internet
Internet Providers

Sector Classification

20/7/1977

03/09/2002

YES_STAND

25/7/2007

27/7/2007

NO

22/11/1994

27/06/2002

YES_STAND

16/9/1997

13/10/2006

NO

20/7/1977

7/4/2006

YES_STAND

09/11/1998

18/10/2007

NO

03/10/2007

05/10/2007

NO

25/3/2002

25/11/2004

YES_STAND

8/8/1997

14/6/2005

YES_STAND

6/9/2006

27/10/2006

NO

14/12/2005

16/12/2005

NO

Date of
CVM
Register
(d /m /y)

Initial Date in
the Special
Segment

Previously
Listed
Standard
market

5/2/1980

16/4/2002

YES_STAND

20/7/1977
13/6/2007

26/6/2001
26/6/2007

YES_STAND
NO

27/6/2007

29/6/2007

NO

LEVEL 1
ARACRUZ CELULOSE S.A.
BCO BRADESCO S.A.
BCO CRUZEIRO DO SUL S.A.
BCO DAYCOVAL S.A.
BCO ESTADO DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL S.A.
BCO INDUSTRIAL E COMERCIAL S.A.
BCO INDUSVAL S.A.
BCO ITAU HOLDING FINANCEIRA S.A.
BCO PANAMERICANO S.A.
PARANAPANEMA S.A.
BCO PINE S.A.
BCO SOFISA S.A.
BRADESPAR S.A.
BRASIL TELECOM PARTICIPACOES S.A.
BRASIL TELECOM S.A.
BRASKEM S.A.
CENTRAIS ELET BRAS S.A. - ELETROBRAS
CESP – CIA ENERGETICA DE SAO PAULO

Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard
Mills
Commercial banking
Banking services
Finance Activities
Banking services
Banking services
Banking Services
Investment Bank
Finance Activities
Banking services
Banking Services
Investment and Commercial
Bank
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Cooper Goods
Holding
Investment Bank
Commercial Credit
Investments
Holding
Telecommunications
Wired Telecommunications
Carriers
Telecommunications
Wired Telecommunications
Carriers
Petrochemical Manufacturing
Basic Chemical Manufacturing
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction

20/7/1977

31/7/2007

YES_STAND

17/09/2007

15/10/2007

NO

10/7/2007
No date

12/7/2007
26/6/2001

NO
YES_STAND

12/11/2007

19/11/2007

NO

20/07/1977

03/12/2007

YES_STAND

27/3/2007
26/4/2007

2/4/2007
2/5/2007

NO
NO

7/8/2000

26/6/2001

NO

19/8/1998

9/5/2002

YES_STAND

27/3/1980

9/5/2002

YES_STAND

18/12/1978

13/2/2003

YES_STAND

28/1/1971

29/9/2006

YES_STAND

27/9/1971

28/7/2006

YES_STAND
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CIA BRASILEIRA DE DISTRIBUICAO
CIA ENERGETICA DE MINAS GERAIS CEMIG
CIA FIACAO TECIDOS CEDRO CACHOEIRA
CIA TRANSMISSAO ENERGIA ELET
PAULISTA
CIA VALE DO RIO DOCE
CONFAB INDUSTRIAL S.A.
DURATEX S.A.
FRAS-LE S.A.
GERDAU S.A.
IOCHPE MAXION S.A.
ITAUSA INVESTIMENTOS ITAU S.A.
KLABIN S.A.
MANGELS INDUSTRIAL S.A.
METALURGICA GERDAU S.A.
PARANA BCO S.A.
RANDON S.A. IMPLEMENTOS E
PARTICIPACOES
S.A. FABRICA DE PRODS ALIMENTICIOS
VIGOR
SADIA S.A.
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A.
SUZANO PAPEL E CELULOSE S.A.
ULTRAPAR PARTICIPACOES S.A.
UNIBANCO HOLDINGS S.A.
UNIBANCO UNIAO DE BCOS BRASILEIROS
S.A.
UNIPAR UNIAO DE IND PETROQ S.A.
USINAS SID DE MINAS GERAIS S.A.-USIMINAS
VOTORANTIM CELULOSE E PAPEL S.A.

Commercial
Food Retailer
Power and Communication Line
and Related Structures
Construction
Textile and Fabric Finishing
Mills
Power Generation
Power Transmission
Iron Ore Mining
Iron Processing
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Wood Product Manufacturing
Vehicle Parts Manufacturing
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Vehicle Parts Manufacturing
Rail Trailer Parts Manufacturing
Finances
Banking services and Holdings
Wood Product Manufacturing
Forestry and Logging
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Management and Holdings
Finance
Banking services
Vehicle Parts Manufacturing
Food Manufacturing
Dairy Products
Meat and Meat Product
Merchant Wholesalers
Rubber and Plastics Footwear
Manufacturing
Paper and Paper Product
Woods
Paper Mills
Commercial and Industrial
Holdings
Finances
Banking services
Holdings
Finances
Investment bank
Petrochemical Manufacturing
Primary Metal Manufacturing
Laminated Plans
Paper and Paper Product
Woods
Paper Mills

4/4/1995

23/4/2003

YES_STAND

30/6/1971

17/10/2001

YES_STAND

11/8/1969

2/10/2003

YES_STAND

14/7/1999

18/9/2002

YES_STAND

2/1/1970

12/12/2003

YES_STAND

21/8/1980
26/4/1966
20/7/1977
3/9/1980

19/12/2003
05/05/2005
11/11/2004
26/6/2001

YES_STAND
YES_STAND
YES_STAND
YES_STAND

17/7/1984

10/11/2005

YES_STAND

20/7/1977

26/6/2001

YES_STAND

6/8/1997

10/12/2002

YES_STAND

28/12/1971

21/3/2003

YES_STAND

17/5/1968

25/6/2003

YES_STAND

11/6/2007

14/6/2007

NO

5/2/1993

26/6/2001

YES_STAND

21/2/1984

4/10/2001

YES_STAND

27/12/2000

26/6/2003

YES_STAND

20/7/1977

15/7/2003

YES_STAND

15/4/1992

8/5/2003

YES_STAND

27/9/1999

27/10/2005

YES_STAND

24/1/1995

26/6/2001

YES_STAND

20/7/1977

26/6/2001

YES_STAND

8/12/1971

24/11/2004

YES_STAND

11/04/1994

11/10/2007

YES_STAND

2/6/1986

14/11/2001

YES_STAND

Source: Author’s elaboration is based on information available on the CVM and Bovespa’s websites.
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TABLE 8
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Novo Mercado.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital. Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders,
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification.
NOVO MERCADO
Companies with controlling
shareholder (27)*
Shareholder

voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)

Total capital
(mean)

Companies without a controlling
shareholder (65)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)

Total capital
(mean)

Total Sample (92)
Voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)

Total capital
(mean)

Largest
60,87%
0,00
60,87%
26,23%
0,00
26,23%
36,39%
0,00
36,39%
3 Largest
70,40%
0,00
70,40%
47,28%
0,00
47,28%
52,38%
0,00
52,38%
5 Largest
70,91%
0,00
70,91%
54,73%
0,00
54,73%
56,16%
0,00
56,16%
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007, except for company MPX whose ownership data
come from its IPO prospectus (on Dec. 12th. 2007).
.

TABLE 9
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital. Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders,
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification.
LEVEL 2
Companies with controlling
shareholder (14)
Shareholder

voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
19,93%
24,21%
33,20%

Total capital
(mean)

Companies without a controlling
shareholder (6)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
15,88%
18,52%
30,08%

Total capital
(mean)

Total Sample (20)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
18,72%
21,93%
31,95%

Largest
75,91%
48,83%
38,84%
26,45%
64,79%
3 Largest
96,08%
52,28%
65,56%
39,52%
83,87%
5 Largest
97,93%
59,21%
82,10%
52,12%
91,60%
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007.

Total capital
(mean)

42,11%
47,18%
56,37%
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TABLE 10
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital. Some of the companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders,
and in these cases they are dropped from this classification.
LEVEL 1
Companies with controlling
shareholder (31)
Shareholder

voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
8,13%
20,76%
34,16%

Total capital
(mean)

Companies without controlling
shareholder (13)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
4,72%
6,36%
16,01%

Total capital
(mean)

Total Sample (44)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
7,12%
16,09%
25,08%

Largest
76,07%
39,33%
32,31%
19,27%
63,14%
3 Largest
89,27%
53,35%
64,20%
35,42%
81,14%
5 Largest
92,75%
63,15%
76,83%
47,60%
84,79%
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and Annual
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007.

Total capital
(mean)

33,40%
47,54%
55,37%

TABLE 11
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on the standard market.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital. Some companies may present fewer than 3 or 5 largest shareholders, and in
these cases they are dropped from this classification.
STANDARD
Companies with controlling
shareholder (133)
Shareholder

voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
27,00%
43,31%
47,20%

Total capital
(mean)

Companies without controlling
shareholder (50)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
11,15%
26,51%
37,42%

Total capital
(mean)

Total Sample (183)
voting
capital
(mean)

nonvoting
capital
(mean)
22,65%
37,30%
42,31%

Largest
77,48%
58,58%
33,62%
24,42%
65,50%
3 Largest
89,72%
69,78%
67,64%
51,57%
81,64%
5 Largest
92,22%
71,25%
78,80%
66,18%
85,19%
Source: Author’s calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website. Annual
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007.

Total capital
(mean)

49,23%
63,06%
68,64%
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Cidade
de Deus
48,38
24,30

Nova
Cidade
44,62
44,62
Fundaç
Bradesc
32,99
32,99

Fundaç
Bradesc
46,30
73,29

Lia
Maria
7,57
7,57

Elo
Part.
53,70
25,85

Banco
Bradesc
100
0,00

Bco
Bilbao
5,05
2,52
Bco
(ES)
4,93
2,97

Lina
Maria
8,46
8,46

Caixa
Fun.Br
0,00
0,86

Fundaç
Bradesc
15,14
9,30

Bradesc
Seguro
100
0,00

Bradesc
Capit
10,28
10,28
Joaq.
Monteir
99,99
99,99
Astrid
Monteir
99,99
99,99
SOC.
Ltda
0,01
0,01
Celi
Monteir
99,99
99,99
SOC.
Ltda
0,01
0,01
Sergio
Monteir
99,99
99,99
SOC.
Ltda
0,01
0,01

SOC.
Ltda
8,29
8,29
AMC
part.
5,17
5,17
CEJMC
part.
5,17
5,17
SAMC
Part
5,17
5,17
Joaqui
m Alv
14,03
14,03
Euroam
erican
7,50
7,50
Olavo
Egidio
7,80
7,80
Fundo
BESC
10,07
10,07
Joaq.
Monteir
4,16
4,16

Israel
Klabin

Espolio
M. klabin

Alberto
Klabin

Leonardo
Klabin

Stela
Klabin

Maria
Klabin

Dan
Klabin

Gabriel
Klabin

00,00
14,29

0,00
0,00

16,67
14,29

16,67
14,29

16,67
14,29

16,67
14,28

16,66
14,28

16,66
14,28

Silvia L.
Piva

Pedro L.
Piva

Horácio
L. Piva

Regina
Piva

Eduardo
Piva

Daniel
Klabin

Amanda
Klabin

Rose
Klabin

David
Klabin

0,00
66,66

0,00
0,01

33,34
11,11

33,33
11,11

33,33
11,11

53,05
53,05

15,65
15,65

15,65
15,65

15,65
15,65

Israel
Klabin

Espolio
M. klabin

Alberto
Klabin

Leonardo
Klabin

Stela
Klabin

Maria
Klabin

Dan
Klabin

Gabriel
Klabin

14,29
14,29

0,03
0,03

14,28
14,28

14,28
14,28

14,28
14,28

14,28
14,28

14,28
14,28

14,28
14,28

KLA
Miguel
Lafer
99,99
99,99

Miguel
Lafer
50
50

Mildred
Lafer

0,01
0,01

Armand
Klabin

Wollf
Klabin

57,44
57,44

10,64
10,64

DanielaK Bernardo
labin
Klabin

10,64
10,64

10,64
10,64

Jose
Klabin

11,07
11,07

10,64
10,64

GL

Vera
Lafer

Vera
Lafer

Graziela
Lafer

Lílian
Klabin

50
50

99,99
99,99

99,99
99,99

100,00
100,00

JKL

MLP

12,52
12,52

6,26
6,26

Monteiro
Aranha S.A.
20,03
8,87

VFV
6,26
6,26

PRESH
12,52
12,52

GL

Lílian
Klabin

GLIND DARO

12,52
12,52

11,07
11,07

Klabin Irmão e
CIA.
51,70
17,85

11,07
11,07

DAWO ESLI
JOBE
11,07
11,07

8,36
8,36

LKL

100,00
100,00

99,99
99,99

8,35
8,35

Vera
Lafer

25,05
25,05

50
50

DARO

MEKL
A
16,70
16,70
Pedro
Piva
12,52
12,52

BNDESPAR
0,00
20,25

Armand
Klabin
0,51
0,51

Daniel
Klabin

53,05
53,05
Amanda
Klabin

15,65
15,65

DAWO
JOBE
10,56
10,56

Niblak

Miguel
Lafer
50
50

KL

11,07
11,07

7,80
2,70

KLABIN S.A

12,52
12,52

Grazieala
Lafer

Rose
Klabin

ESLI
99,99
99,99

15,65
15,65

Armand
Klabin

David
Klabin

57,44
57,44

15,65
15,65

Wollf
Klabin

10,64
10,64
DanielaK
labin
Lílian
Klabin

10,64
10,64

100,00
100,00

Bernardo
Klabin

10,64
10,64
Jose
Klabin

10,64
10,64
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DIAGRAM 1: ABBREVIATIONS
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JKL - JACOB KLABIN LAFER ADM. E PART. S.A.
MLP - MIGUEL LAFER PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
VFV - VFV PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
PRESH - PRESH S.A.
GL - GL S.A. PARTICIPAÇÕES
GLIND - GLIMDAS PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
DARO - DARO PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
DAWOJOBE - DAWOJOBE PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
ESLI - ESLI PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
LKL - LKL PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
Bradesc Seguro - BRADESCO SEGUROS S/A
Banco Bradesc - BANCO BRADESCO S/A
Cidade de Deus - CIDADE DE DEUS CIA.CIAL DE PARTIC.
Nova Cidade - NOVA CIDADE DE DEUS PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A
Fundaç Bradesc - FUNDAÇÃO BRADESCO
ELO - ELO PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A
Caixa Func. Br- CAIXA BENEF. FUNCIONÁRIOS DO BRADESCO
Bco Bilbao - BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA S/A
Bco (ES) - BANCO ESPÍRITO SANTO S/A
SOC. Ltda - SOC. TÉCNICA MONTEIRO ARANHA LTDA.
Euroamerican - EUROAMERICAN FINANCE CORPORATION
AMC Part. - AMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.
CJMC Part - CEJMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.
SAMC Part - SAMC PARTICIPAÇÕES S/C LTDA.
NIBLAK - NIBLAK PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
KL - KL PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.
GL - GL S.A. PARTICIPAÇÕES
KLA - KLA RO PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.
DARO - DARO PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A
DAWOJOBE - DAWOJOBE PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A
MEKLA - MEKLA DELTA PARTICIPAÇÕES LTDA.
BNDESPAR - BNDES PARTICIPAÇÕES S/A - BNDESPAR

89

TABLE 12
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed at Novo Mercado accounting for
shareholders’ agreement.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital.

Companies with a controlling
shareholder (27)
Shareholder

Largest

Total Sample (92)

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

60,87

Largest

26,23

Largest

36,39

Companies with a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (47)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

NEW MARKET
Companies without a controlling
shareholder (65)

voting capital (mean)

62,74

Companies without a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (45)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

26,98

Total Sample taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (92)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

45,25

Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders’ agreements
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

No. of
firms

voting capital not taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

voting capital taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

20

28,06

65,27

Source: Author’s calculation based on shareholders’ agreements available on the CVM website.
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TABLE 13
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2 accounting for shareholders’
agreement.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital.

Companies with a controlling
shareholder (14)

LEVEL 2
Companies without a controlling
shareholder (6)

Total Sample (20)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Largest

75,91

Largest

38,84

Largest

64,79

Companies with a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (18)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

72,19

Companies without a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (2)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

46,29

Total Sample taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (20)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

69,60

Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholder agreements
Shareholder

No. of
firms

voting capital not taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

voting capital taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

Largest Shareholders
Block

4

35,11

55,86

Source: Author’s calculation based on shareholders’ agreements available on the CVM website.
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TABLE 14
Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1 accounting for shareholders’
agreement.
A company with a majority shareholder is one that a single shareholder has more than 50% of
the voting capital.

Companies with a controlling
shareholder (31)

LEVEL 1
Companies without a controlling
shareholder (13)

Total Sample (44)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Shareholder

voting capital (mean)

Largest

76,07

Largest

31,26

Largest

63,14

Companies with a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (40)
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

74,99

Companies without a controlling
shareholder taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (3) *
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

42,94

Total Sample taking into account
shareholders’ agreements (43)*
Shareholder
Largest Shareholders
Block

voting capital (mean)

72,75

Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders’ agreements (9)
Shareholder

No. of
firms

voting capital not taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

voting capital taking into account shareholder
agreements (mean)

Largest Shareholders
Block

9

27,00

70,09

Source: Author’s calculation based on shareholders’ agreements available on the CVM website.
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TABLE 15
Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Novo Mercado
NEW MARKET (92)
Companies with controlling shareholders (27)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure ( 8)

Indirect Structure (19)

Total Sample (27)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

0
1
3

0
52,06
62,82

0
52,06
62,82

0
2
17

0,00
64,29
61,89

0,00
64,29
54,37

0
3
20

0,00
60,21
62,03

0,00
60,21
55,64

4

60,83

60,83

0

0

0

4

60,83

60,83

Companies without controlling shareholders (65)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure ( 31)

Indirect Structure (34)

Total Sample (65)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

4
17
9

9,95
22,40
23,01

9,95
22,40
23,01

2
4
28

37,52
22,45
37,07

18,09
22,45
33,29

6
21
37

19,14
22,41
33,65

12,66
22,41
30,79

1

49,50

49,50

0

0

0

1

49,50

49,50

Companies with and without controlling shareholders (92)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure ( 39)

Indirect Structure (53)

Total Sample (92)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

4
18
12

9,95
24,05
32,96

9,95
24,05
32,96

2
6
45

37,52
36,40
46,44

18,09
36,40
41,26

6
24
57

19,14
27,14
43,61

12,66
27,14
39,51

5

58,56

58,56

0

0

0

5

58,56

58,56

Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website

TABLE 16
Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization
in the Novo Mercado
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions.
Novo Mercado
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or family
Government
TOTAL

Companies with controlling
shareholders (27)

Companies without controlling
shareholders (65)

Total Sample (92)

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

0
3
20
4
27

0,00
17.096.422.523,52
77.545.682.907,49
94.405.937.408,35
189.048.042.839,36

0,00
9,04
41,02
49,94
100

6
21
37
1
65

64.746.363.054,48
76.726.010.803,99
93.115.605.752,27
5.656.264.144,20
240.244.243.754,94

26,95
31,94
38,76
2,35
100

6
24
57
5
92

64.746.363.054,48
93.822.433.327,51
170.661.288.659,76
100.062.201.552,55
429.292.286.594,30

15,08
21,86
39,75
23,31
100

Source: Author’s calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007.
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TABLE 17
Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 2
LEVEL 2 (20)
Companies with controlling shareholders (14)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (6)

Indirect Structure (8)

Total Sample (14)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

0
3
2

0,00
75,39
92,48

0,00
50,79
71,10

0
1
6

0,00
61,34
80,02

0,00
6,34
48,60

0
4
8

0
71,88
83,13

0
39,68
54,22

1

50,18

20,20

1

70,02

16,38

2

60,10

16,38

Companies without controlling shareholders (6)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (3)

Indirect Structure (3)

Total Sample (6)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

0
1
2

0,00
32,78
44,20

0,00
26,98
15,79

0
0
3

0,00
0,00
45,80

0,00
0,00
25,59

0
1
5

0,00
32,78
45,16

0,00
26,98
21,67

0

0,00

0,00

0

0,00

0,00

0

0,00

0,00

Companies with and without controlling shareholders (20)
Shareholder

Direct Structure ( 9)

Indirect Structure (11)

Total Sample (20)
voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

Institutional
0
0,00
0,00
0
0,00
0,00
0
0,00
Foreign
4
64,74 44,84
1
61,34
6,34
5
64,06
Individual or
4
68,34 43,44
9
68,61
40,93
13
68,53
family
Government
1
50,18 20,20
1
70,02
16,38
2
60,10
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website

0,00
37,14
41,70

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

18,29

TABLE 18
Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the Level 2
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions.
LEVEL 2
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or family
Government
TOTAL

Companies with controlling
shareholders (14)

Companies without controlling
shareholders (6)

Total Sample (20)

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

0
4
8
2
14

0,00
13.164.547.105,35
29.029.333.846,20
11.885.829.089,44
54.079.710.040,99

0,00
24,34
53,68
21,98
100

0
1
5
0
6

0,00
3.281.505.350,79
20.516.692.337,43
0,00
23.798.197.688,22

0,00
13,79
86,21
0,00
100

0
5
13
2
20

0,00
16.446.052.456,14
49.546.026.183,63
11.885.829.089,44
77.877.907.729,21

0,00
21,12
63,62
15,26
100

Source: Author’s calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007
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TABLE 19
Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 1
LEVEL 1 (31)
Companies with controlling shareholders (31)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (7)

Indirect Structure (24)

Total Sample (31)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

0
1
2

0,00
99,22
76,64

0,00
38,99
54,69

3
2
19

48,01
75,36
75,60

13,89
36,85
34,49

3
3
21

48,01
83,31
75,70

13,89
37,56
36,41

4

74,56

29,04

0

0

0

4

74,56

29,04

Companies without controlling shareholders (13)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (2)

Indirect Structure (11)

Total Sample (13)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

1
0
1

49,77
0
30,78

49,08
0
18,95

2
1
8

65,02
21,57
51,96

22,27
11,03
30,81

3
1
9

59,93
21,57
49,61

31,20
11,03
29,49

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Companies with and without controlling shareholders (44)
Shareholder

Direct Structure ( 9)

Indirect Structure (35)

Total Sample (44)
voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

Institutional
1
49,77 49,08
5
58,40
17,24
6
53,97
Foreign
1
99,22 38,99
3
57,43
28,24
4
67,88
Individual or
3
61,35 42,78
27
68,60
33,40
30
67,87
family
Government
4
74,56 29,04
0
0
0
4
74,56
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website.

22,55
30,93
34,34

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

29,04

TABLE 20
Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the Level 1
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions.
LEVEL 1
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or family
Government
TOTAL

Companies with controlling
shareholders (31)

Companies without controlling
shareholders (13)

Total Sample (44)

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

3
3
21
4
31

293.689.552.246,58
15.675.512.187,34
265.475.374.283,31
56.914.808.603,38
631.755.247.320,61

46,49
2,48
42,02
9,01
100

3
1
9
0
13

129.480.474.380,80
26.432.048.308,20
91.033.251.818,31
0,00
246.945.774.507,31

52,43
10,70
36,86
0,00
100

6
4
30
4
44

423.170.026.627,38
42.107.560.495,54
356.508.626.101,62
56.914.808.603,38
878.701.021.827,92

48,16
4,79
40,57
6,48
100

Source: Author’s calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007
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TABLE 21
Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in the Standard Market
STANDARD COMPANIES (183)
Companies with controlling shareholders (133)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (29)

Indirect Structure (104)

Total Sample (133)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

2
9
7

95,60
76,13
75,55

63,25
63,30
44,79

8
18
71

49,91
81,97
71,50

34,46
69,44
45,97

10
27
78

59,05
80,03
71,87

40,22
67,39
45,86

11

75,19

63,45

7

68,54

44,79

18

72,61

58,07

Companies without controlling shareholders (50)
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or
family
Government

Direct Structure (23)

Indirect Structure (27)

Total Sample (50)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

3
4
16

19,66
40,35
28,78

18,14
30,07
19,84

0
6
21

0
71,79
56,83

0
62,72
37,61

3
10
37

19,66
59,22
44,70

18,14
49,66
29,93

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Companies with and without controlling shareholders (92)
Shareholder

Direct Structure ( 52)

Indirect Structure (131)

Total Sample (183)
voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

Institutional
5
50,04 36,18
8
49,91
34,46
13
49,96
Foreign
13
65,13 53,08
24
79,42
67,76
37
74,40
Individual or
23
43,02 27,43
92
68,15
44,06
115
63,13
family
Government
11
75,19 63,45
7
68,54
44,79
18
72,61
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website

35,12
62,60
40,74

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

voting
capital
(mean)

Total
capital
(mean)

No. of
firms

38,07

TABLE 22
Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market Capitalization in the
standard market
Market capitalization is reported in R$ millions.
STANDARD
Shareholder
Institutional
Foreign
Individual or family
Government
TOTAL

Companies with controlling
shareholders (133)
No. of
firms
10
27
78
18
133

Companies without controlling
shareholders (50)

Total Sample (183)

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

No. of
firms

Market Capitalization
em R$

%

19.571.494.252,55
287.885.347.991,44
37.182.969.910,46
448.989.230.512,91
793.629.042.667,36

2,47
36,27
4,69
56,57
100

3
10
37
0
50

1.921.836.112,68
73.849.331.727,51
53.922.161.095,74
0,00
129.693.328.935,93

1,48
56,94
41,58
0,00
100

13
37
115
18
183

21.493.330.365,23
361.734.679.718,95
91.105.131.006,20
448.989.230.512,91
923.322.371.603,29

2,33
39,18
9,87
48,63
100

Source: Author’s calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007
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TABLE 23
Mechanisms of Separation Between Control and Ownership in Brazil
ALL COMPANIES (339)
Shareholders

Institutional
Foreign
Individual or family
Government

Total Sample

Firms with pyramidal
structure

voting capital/total
capital

No of firms

No of firms

15
34
173
8
230

percentage

4.42
10.03
51.03
2.36
68.84

18
39
148
20
225

percentage

5.31
11.50
43.66
5.90
66.37

Source: Author’s calculations are based on information available on the CVM website.
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TABLE 24: Types of Shareholders’ Agreements
Type of Shareholders’ Agreements
Number of
companies

16

12

03
03
02
02
02
01
01

Name of companies

Abyara Planejamento Imobiliário S.A. (NM)
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Bio. Ol. Veg. S.A. (NM)
Cia. Concessões Rodoviárias (NM)
CPFL Energia S.A. (NM)
CSU Cardsystem (NM)
EZ TEC Empreendimentos e Participações S.A. (NM)
Positivo Informática S.A. (NM)
Redecard S.A. (NM)
Rodobens Negócios Imobiliários S.A. (NM)
ALL América Latina Logística S.A. (L 2)
Marcopolo S.A. (L 2)
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. (L 2)
Aracruz Celulose S.A. (L 1)
Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. (L 1)
BRADESPAR S.A. (L 1)
Sadia S.A. (L 1)
Açúcar Guarani S.A. (NM)
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A. (NM)
Cia. Providência Indústria e Comércio (NM)
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A. Empreendimentos e Participações (NM)
Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A. (NM)
Light S.A. (NM)
Natura Cosméticos S.A. (NM)
Tempo Participações S.A. (NM)
Santos-Brasil S.A. (L 2)
Cia. Fiação Tecidos Cedro Cachoeira (L 1)
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. (L 1)
Usiminas S.A. (L 1)
Agra Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. (NM)
Odontoprev S.A. (NM)
Perdigão S.A. (NM)
Brasilagro – Cia. Brasileira de Propriedades Agrícolas (NM)
Inpar S.A. (NM)
Medial Saúde S.A. (NM)
Indústrias Romi S.A. (NM)
Banco Bradesco S.A. (L 1)
Grendene S.A. (NM)
Banco Indusval (L 1)
EDP – Energias do Brasil S.A. (NM)
Itaúsa Investimentos Itaú S.A. (L 1)
Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros – BM&F S.A. (NM)
LPS Brasil - Consultoria de Imóveis S.A. (NM)

Purchase/
sale of
shares

X

X
X

Preference
to
purchases
shares

Voting
rights

Control
Exercise

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

Source: Author’s elaboration. Shareholders’ agreements available on the CVM website, visited between Sept. and Dec.
2007.
NM – Novo Mercado; L 2 – Level 2; L 1 – Level 1.
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TABLE 25: Types of Clauses in Shareholders’ agreements that Bind Directors’ Votes
Subjects that Bind Directors’ Votes In
Shareholders Agreements

No. of
Companies

Name of Companies
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.

Alienation, leasing, disposal, placement of
financial burden over goods and rights of the
company– related to its assets

Distribution of earnings, dividends, interest
rates over own capital

Entering into general contracts within value
range/maximum term stipulated in the
shareholders’ agreements

Approval of annual, semi annual and
pluriannual budgets / Business plans

14

11

10

10

Listing
Segment
NM

Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

NM

Cia. Providência Ind. Com.

NM

CPFL Energia S.A

NM

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

Inpar S.A.

NM

Light S.A.

NM

Medial Saúde S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.

NM
NM

ALL América Latina Logística S.A.

L2

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L2

Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Usiminas S.A.

L1
L1

Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.

NM

Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.

NM

Brasilagro-Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

NM

CPFL Energia S.A

NM

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

Inpar S.A.
Light S.A.

NM
NM

Perdigão S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.

NM
NM

Santos-Brasil S.A.
Usiminas S.A.

L2
L1

Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.

NM

Cia. Providência Ind. Com.

NM

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

Light S.A.

NM

Medial Saúde S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.

NM
NM

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L2

Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Usiminas S.A.

L1
L1

Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

NM
NM

Cia. Providência Ind. Com.

NM

CPFL Energia S.A

NM

Light S.A.

NM

Tempo Participações S.A.

NM

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2
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Issuance of securities

09

Election or dismissal of managers

08

Liquidation, dissolution, merger,
incorporation, and transformation of the
company

06

Nomination or dismissal of independent
auditors

06

Plans of judicial or extra judicial
reorganization, or bankruptcy

06

Amortization, redemption or acquisition of
shares to be held by corporate treasury or to be
cancelled

Acquisition of shareholding participation in
other companies

Establishing/providing warranties by the
company

06

06

05

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L1

Iochpe-Maxion S.A.

L1

Usiminas S.A.
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Medial Saúde S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

L1
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
L1
NM

Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CPFL Energia S.A.
Light S.A.
Medial Saúde S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
ALL América Latina Logística S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CPFL Energia S.A
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.

NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
L1
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
NM

Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

NM

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

Light S.A.

NM

ALL América Latina Logística S.A.

L2

Usiminas S.A.

L1

Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A
Inpar S.A.
Light S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.

NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
NM
NM
NM
L2
L1
NM
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Changes in the Bylaws

05

Transactions between the company and
shareholders or their related parties

05

Creation of corporate groups (joint ventures,
or strategic alliances)

04

Purchase of new shares by the company

04

Compensation policy and benefits for
managers and board members

04

Determination of the criteria for establishing
managers’ remuneration

04

Changes in the corporation’s business

04

Issuance of new classes of shares

04

Reduction of/raising social capital

04

Entering into transactions between the
company, its controlling, affiliated or
controlled companies

04

Increase of capital within the limits of the
authorized capital

04

Changes in accounting policies

03

Creation/ extinction of controlling companies
03

Making other businesses than those related to
the corporate purpose

Initiating suits/ arbitration procedures in
which the company is a party

03

02

Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
Light S.A.
Medial Saúde S.A.
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
Light S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Light S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Light S.A.
Usiminas S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Inpar S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A.
Inpar S.A.
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
Light S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
Cia. Providência Ind. Com.
CPFL Energia S.A.
Inpar S.A.

NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
L2
L2
NM
NM
NM
L2
NM
NM
L2
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L1
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM

ALL América Latina Logística S.A.

L2

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2
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Alienation of Shares by the Company of their
subsidiaries
Creation/liquidation, acquisition and
alienation of subsidiaries
Proxy authorization conferred to any person in
order to decide about any subject that requires
shareholders’ votes or alienation of assets

02

02

ALL América Latina Logística S.A.

L2

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L2

Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Brasilagro –Cia. Brasileira Prop. Agrícolas S.A.

NM
L1
NM

Tempo Participações S.A.

NM

Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Medial Saúde S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.

NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
L2
NM

02

Installation/ election of members of the fiscal
board
Election of board members

02

Remuneration of board members

02

Decision of omitted cases
Offering call options or subscription of shares
to managers, board members, and employees
of the company

02
02

Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.

NM
NM

Changes in the number of managers and board
members
Issuance of non-voting shares or increase in
the number of classes of existing non-voting
shares
Issuance of subscription bonuses
Changes in the terms of contracts on
permission of public services
Detailing matters for committee analysis
Remuneration of committee members
Entering/ altering contracts of personal
insurance of the CEO or other key manager of
the company
Hiring consulting service of third parties not
expressed in the company’s plans

01

Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Ol. Veg. S.A.

NM

01

Perdigão S.A.

NM

01
01

CPFL Energia S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A

NM
NM

01
01

CPFL Energia S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A.

NM
NM

01

CSU Cardsystem S.A.

NM

01

Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A.

L2

01
01

Perdigão S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.

NM
L2

01

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L2

01

Santos-Brasil S.A.

L2

01

Light S.A.

NM

Creation of Founder’s shares (shares with
special rights)
Creation of committees and technical or
advisory commissions
Contracting, altering, breaching shareholders’
agreements or any fiduciary business
Rules for issuance and cancellation of Units
Creation of capital reserve for contingencies
or any kind of operation which may result in a
reduction of the profits that shall be
distributed among the shareholders

02

Register of securities offerings or going
01
Light S.A.
NM
private transactions
Source: Author’s Elaboration. Shareholders Agreements Available in CVM Website. NM – New Market; L 2– Level 2;L 1 –
Level 1.
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TABLE 26
Adoption (and Types) of Poison Pills Clauses by Companies Listed on Novo Mercado,
Level 2 and Level 1
Companies Listed On Novo Mercado
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Abyara Planejamento Imobiliário S.A.
Açúcar Guarani S.A.
Agra Empreendimentos Imobiliários
S.A.
American Banknote S.A.
Bematech Indústria e Comércio de
Equipamentos Eletrônicos S.A.
Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros S.A.
Bovespa Holding S.A.
BR Mall Participações S.A.
Brasil Brokers Participações S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Indústria e Comércio
de Biocombustíveis e Óleos Vegetais
S.A.
Brasilagro – Companhia Brasileira de
Propriedades Agrícolas
Companhia Brasileira
Desenvolvimento Imobiliário e
Turístico
Companhia Concessões Rodoviárias
Companhia Hering
Companhia Providência Indústria e
Comécio
Company S.A.
Construtora Tenda S.A.
COSAN S.A. Indústria e Comércio
CPFL Energia S.A.
CR2 Empreendimentos Imobiliários
S.A.
Cremer S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A.
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A.
Empreendimentos e Participações
Cyrela Commercial Property S.A.
Empreendimentos e Participações
Datasul S.A.
Diagnósticos da América S.A.
Drogasil S.A.
EDP - Energias do Brasil S.A.
Embraer – Empresa Brasileira de
Aeronáutica S.A.
Eternit S.A.
Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A.
EZ TEC Empreendimentos e
Participações S.A.
Gafisa S.A.
Grendene S.A.
GVT Holding S.A.
Helbor Empreendimentos S.A.
Indústrias Romi S.A.
Inpar S.A.
Klabin Segall S.A.
Light S.A.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Types Of
Poison Pills’
Clauses
A

Threshold Of Poison
Pills’ Clauses
Type A
Type B
20%
-

Types Of Penalty
Clauses For Breach
Of Poison Pills
1 and 2

Yes
Yes

A and B
A

20%
25%

10%
-

1 and 2
1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A
A
A and B

20%
20%
30%

10%

1
1
1 and 2

Yes

A

20%

-

1 and 2

Yes

A

35%

-

1

Yes
Yes
Yes

A
-

20%
-

-

1
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A
A
-

20%
20%
-

-

1
1
-

Yes
Yes
Yes

A
-

20%
-

-

1
-

Yes

A

15%

-

1 and 2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A and B
A
A

15%
15%
35%

5%
-

1 and 2
1 and 2
1

Yes
Yes
Yes

A
A and B

20%
15%

8%

1
1 and 2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A and B
A
A
A and B
A and B
-

15%
20%
15%
20%
15%
-

9,9%
10%
5%
-

1
1 and 2
1 and 2
1 and 2
1 and 2
-

Super Tagalong

103

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Localiza Rent a Car S.A.
Log-In Logística Intermodal S.A.
Lojas Renner S.A.
LPS Consultoria de Imóveis S.A.
Lupatech S.A.
Medial Saúde S.A.
Metalfrio Solutions S.A.
MRV Engenharia S.A.
Natura Cosméticos S.A.
Odontoprev S.A.
PDG Realty Empreendimentos e
Participações S.A.
Perdigão S.A.
Porto Seguro S.A.
Positivo Informática S.A.
Profarma Distribuidora de Produtos
Farmacêuticos S.A.
Redecard S.A.
Renar Maçãs S.A.
Rodobens Negócios Imobiliários S.A.
Rossi Residencial S.A.
São Carlos Empreendimentos e
Participações S.A.
São Martinho S.A.
SLC Agrícola S.A.
Tegma Gestão Logística S.A.
Tempo Participações S.A.
Totvs S.A.
Companies Listed On Level 2

ALL América Latina Logística S.A.
Kroton Educacional S.A.
Marcopolo S.A.
Multiplan S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A.
Saraiva S.A.
Companies Listed On Level 1

Aracruz Celulose S.A.
Banco Bradesco S.A.
Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A.
Banco Indusval S.A.
Banco Panamericano S.A.
BRADESPAR S.A.
Companhia de Fiação e Tecidos Cedro
e Cachoeira
Iochpe-Maxion S.A.
Itaúsa Investimentos Itaú S.A.
Metalúrgica Gerdau S.A.
Paranapanema S.A.
Sadia S.A.
Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais
S.A.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

B
A
A
A and B
A
A
B
A and B
A
-

35%
20%
20%
20%
20%
15%
15%
-

10%
8%
10%
30%
-

1
1 and 2
1 and 2
1 and 2
1
1
1
1
1 and 2
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A
B
A
A and B

20%
10%
20%

10%
10%

1 and 2
1
1 and 2
1 and 2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

A
A and B
B
A

26%
15%
25%

5%
15%
-

1
1 and 2
1
1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Super Tagalong

A
A
A
A and B
Types Of
Poison Pills’
Clauses

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Super Tagalong

A
A
A
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
-

Types Of
Poison Pills’
Clauses
-

10%
20%
20%
20%
8%
Threshold Of Poison
Pills’ Clauses
Type A
Type B
15%
20%
20%
Threshold Of Poison
Pills’ Clauses
Type A
Type B
-

1
1 and 2
1
Types Of Penalty
Clauses For Breach
Of Poison Pills
-

Yes
-

-

-

-

-

1
1
1
1 and 2
Types Of Penalty
Clauses For Breach
Of Poison Pills

Source: Author’s elaboration based on the Bylaws of eighty-four companies available on the CVM website. Bylaws
available in the Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006, visited between Sept. 2007 and Dec. 2007.
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